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INTRODUCTION
In 2004, callers to the California state welfare hotline had a curi-
ous choice to make: press "one" for English and speak with a worker
in India, or press "two" for Spanish and speak with a worker in Mex-
ico.' The experience of these California callers reflects a new reality
in the public sector, in which state governments are spending a
large-and often untold-amount of tax dollars on offshore public
contracting. 2 And nearly every state government does it.3 Although
the private sector has offshored jobs for decades, 4 governments have
only recently become "'part of the offshoring bandwagon.' -5 The me-
dia published reports about public sector offshoring during the 2004
election, 6 and since then, lawmakers in virtually every state have intro-
duced legislation to restrict state contractors from performing work
outside of the United States.7 Although only a few states have enacted
offshoring restrictions, state lawmakers continue to introduce anti-off-
shoring legislation. 8
1 See U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-342, OFFSHORING IN Six HUMAN
SERVICES PROGRAMS: OFFSHORING OCCURS IN MOST STATES, PRIMARILY IN CUSTOMER SERVICE
AND SoFrwiARE DEVELOPMENT 17 (2006) [hereinafter GAO OFFSHORING REPORT]; Diane
Lindquist, Calls to State Agencies Go Around the World: Governments Move Toward Outsourcing,
SAN DIEGO UNION-TRiB., Aug. 22, 2004, at Al, LexisNexis Academic.
2 See infra Part I.B.
3 See GAO OFFSHORING REPORT, supra note 1, at 3-5; PHILIP MATTERA ET AL., GOOD
JOBS FIRST, YOUR TAX DOLLARS AT W;ORK ... OFFSHORE: How FOREIGN OUTSOURCING FIRMS
ARE CAPTURING STATE GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS 2 (2004), available at http://
www.goodjobsfirst.org/pdf/offshoringtext.pdf; see also Stella M. Hopkins, U.S. Companies,
Governments Rely on Foreign Workers to Save Money, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Aug. 10, 2003, at
IA, LexisNexis Academic.
4 See Alan S. Blinder, How Many U.S. Jobs Might Be Offshorable? 2 (Ctr. for Econ. Policy
Studies, Working Paper No. 142, 2007).
5 Kevin Rothstein, Ted K Slams Mitt for OutsourcingJobs: Mass Work Farmed Out to India,
Utah, BOSTON HERALD, Feb. 23, 2006, at 6, LexisNexis Academic (quoting U.S. Sen. Ted
Kennedy).
6 See GAO OFFSHORING REPORT, supra note 1, at 1 ("Media reports in 2004 .. .in-
spired proposals ... to restrict 'offshoring' in public programs. . . ."); N. Gregory Mankiw
& Phillip Swagel, The Politics and Economics of Offshore Outsourcing 2 (Am. Enter. Institute,
Working Paper No. 122, 2005) ("[N]o economic issue generated more heat or shed less
light than the debate over offshore outsourcing.").
7 See NAT'L FOUND. FOR AM. POLICY, ANTI-OUTSOURCING EFFORTS DowN BUT NOT OUT
2-6 (2007), http://www.nfap.net/pdf/0407OutsourcingBrief.pdf [hereinafter NFAP
REPORT].
8 See id. at 6.
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This Note argues that state offshore contracting restrictions are
unconstitutional. Part I discusses the scope of public sector offshoring
and the rise of state restrictions to prevent this practice. Part II argues
that state offshore contracting restrictions violate the Foreign Com-
merce Clause of the U.S. Constitution. 9 Under the Supreme Court's
heightened scrutiny of state regulation of foreign commerce,1 0 such
restrictions are invalid because they facially discriminate against for-
eign commerce and prevent the federal government from speaking
with "one voice" in international trade."' By intruding into the sensi-
tive area of international trade, states undermine national trade pol-
icy, frustrate international trade relations, invite retaliation, and
embarrass the nation. Part II also argues that states cannot take shel-
ter in the "market participant" exception to the Interstate Commerce
Clause because the exception does not (or should not) apply to the
Foreign Commerce Clause. Furthermore, even if the exception does
apply, state offshore contracting restrictions fail under the doctrine of
foreign affairs preemption.
Part III discusses the policy implications of this outcome. States
seeking to restrict offshore contracting within the bounds of the Con-
stitution have two options: either withdraw their contracts from the
stream of commerce and perform the services in-house, or seek au-
thorization from Congress to restrict offshore contracting. Accord-
ingly, a state seeking to privatize and keep itsjobs in the United States
must first seek authorization from Congress. After reviewing the costs
and benefits of offshore contracting and given the potential chal-
lenges that offshoring poses for state governments, this Note con-
cludes that the nation must engage in a serious debate about whether
to permit states to restrict offshore contracting. Before this debate
can occur, however, this Note calls on both the federal and state gov-
ernments to make a serious commitment to identify and study the
consequences of offshoring because policy solutions, if any, depend
on the availability of data.
I
STATES JUMP ON THE "OFFSHORING BANDWAGON"
A. The Public Sector: From Offsite to Offshore
Outsourcing, the process of contracting with a third party to pro-
vide goods or services,12 has manifested itself in the public sector
9 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
10 SeeJapan Line, Ltd. v. County of L.A., 441 U.S. 434, 446-49 (1979).
11 See id. at 449, 452-54.
12 See RON HIRA & ANIL HiRA, OUTSOURCING AMERICA: WHAT'S BEHIND OUR NATIONAL
CmsIs AND How WE CAN RECLAIM AMERICAN JOBS 199 (2005).
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through privatization. 13 Gaining favor in the 1980s,1 4 "the most com-
mon [form of privatization] is for governments to 'contract-out"' pub-
lic functions to the private sector.' 5 Privatization continued to grow in
the 1990s as globalization increased "demand for public services" and
state budget constraints pressured "government[s] to 'banish bureau-
cracy' and 'reinvent' the public sector."1 6 Today, as governments con-
tinue to embrace market-based solutions, 17 the value of state and local
government outsourcing is nearly $12 billion and is expected to grow
to $20 billion by 2011.18
This public sector move toward privatization has also given rise to
offshoring, a form of outsourcing in which an entity relocates opera-
tions to another country.' 9 Although offshoring is not a new practice
in the United States-private companies have offshored manufactur-
ing jobs for decades 20-offshoring now affects service-sector jobs and
"is creeping from [the] private [sector] into the arena of govern-
ment."21 Technological advancements combined with the availability
of large pools of foreign labor have opened the door for government
contractors to perform service contracts abroad, particularly in the
area of information technology (IT), 22 which is one of the fastest
13 See Michael J. Ballard & Mildred E. Warner, Taking the High Road: Local Government
Restructuring and the Quest for Quality 1 (Cornell Univ. Dep't of City and Regional Planning,
Cornell Working Papers in Planning No. 194, 2000), http://government.cce.cornell.edu/
doc/reports/highroad.
14 See Peter T. Kilborn, Reagan Plan to Privatize Government Is Gaining Support from Demo-
crats, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 1988, at A10.
15 Ballard & Warner, supra note 13, at 1.
16 Id.; see also NAT'L ASSOC. OF STATE PROCUREMENT OFFICIALS, OFFSHORING AND PRO-
CUREMENT: POSITIONING FOR THE FUTURE 3 (2005), http://www.naspo.org/whitepapers/
OffshoringlssueBrief.pdf.
17 See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE PRESI-
DENT'S MANAGEMENT AGENDA 17 (2002) ("'Government should be market-based-we
should not be afraid of competition, innovation, and choice. I will open government to
the discipline of competition.'" (quoting then-Governor George W. Bush)); Mildred
Warner & Jennifer Gerbasi, Rescaling and Reforming the State Under NAFIA: Implications for
Subnational Authority, 28 INT'LJ. URB. & REGIONAL RES. 858, 859 (2004) (citation omitted).
18 See Press Release, INPUT, INPUT Predicts State & Local Government Outsourcing
Market to Reach $20 Billion in 2011 (Jan. 31, 2007), http://www.input.com/corp/press/
detail.cfm?news= 1308.
19 COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, H. Doc. 108-
145, at 229 (2004), available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fy05/pdf/
2004_erp.pdf. [hereinafter 2004 ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT]; see also GAO OFF-
SHORING REPORT, supra note 1, at 1. Some refer to the practice as "offshore outsourcing,"
for example, 2004 ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, supra, but this Note simply refers
to the concept as "offshoring."
20 Blinder, supra note 4, at 2.
21 Bob Fernandez & Jane M. Von Bergen, State Governments Are OffshoringJobs, RUT-
LAND HERALD (Vt.), Mar. 13, 2004, LexisNexis Academic. Public sector offshoring also
occurs in other countries. See Andrew Taylor, Offshore Jobs Move Revealed in DWP Leak, FIN.
TIMES (London), Jan. 23, 2006, at 3.
22 See GAO OFFSHORING REPORT, supra note 1, at 1.
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growing sectors of state spending.23 One can trace the beginnings of
public sector offshoring in part to the Personal Responsibility and
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996.24 This federal law re-
quires states to centralize certain child-support-payment functions and
establish electronic benefit transfer (EBT) systems for the reimburse-
ment of food stamp and other human services benefits.2 5 States have
largely managed this federal mandate through private contractors,
many of which have in turn performed the contracts outside of the
United States.26
B. The Scope of State Government Offshoring
Although one study estimates that state governments spend at
least $2 billion annually on offshore IT contracting,27 and a U.S. Con-
gresswoman estimates the number could be as high as $3.8 billion, 28
reliable data on the extent of offshoring in the public sector is
sparse. 29 The lack of data is largely due to the failure of most states to
track where their contractors perform the work after the state awards
the contract. 30 Indeed, state procurement officials are sometimes un-
23 See Press Release, INPUT, State & Local IT Outsourcing Spending to Grow by 75
Percent by FY10 (Jan. 23, 2006), available at http://www.input.com/corp/press/
detail.cfm?news= 1132.
24 See GAO OFFSHORING REPORT, supra note 1, at 8; Hopkins, supra note 3, at IA. The
text of the act is located at PUB. L. No. 104-193, 110 STAT. 2105 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 7, 8, 21, 25 & 42 U.S.C.).
25 See GAO OFFSHORING REPORT, supra note 1, at 8-9. EBT systems generally allow
beneficiaries to use a plastic card, similar to a debit-card, to redeem their public benefits.
See id. at 9.
26 See id. at 8-10.
27 See MATrERA ET AL., supra note 3, at 21.
28 See Press Release, Office of U.S. Rep. John D. Dingell, DeLauro, Dingell Introduce
US Worker Protection Act (July 22, 2005), http://www.house.gov/dingell/documents/
press releases/109th-Congress/07-22-05.htm (quoting U.S. Rep. Rosa DeLauro).
29 See GAO OFFSHORING REPORT, supra note 1, at 1 ("[N]o comprehensive data or
studies show the extent of services offshoring by state governments and data for the federal
government are limited."); U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-04-932, INTERNA-
TIONAL TRADE: CURRENT GOVERNMENT DATA PROVIDE LIMITED INSIGHT INTO OFFHSORING OF
SERVICES 3 (2004) [hereinafter GAO TRADE REPORT] ("[A]Ithough there are anecdotal ac-
counts of state governments using offshore sources, no comprehensive data or studies of
the extent to which state governments use these sources are available."). This lack of relia-
ble data also extends to offshoring in the private sector. See generally Blinder, supra note 4,
at 6-7 (collecting studies on estimates ofjob loss); Mankiw & Swagel, supra note 6, at 24-27
(discussing various estimates ofjob loss).
30 See LEG. RESEARCH COMM'N, STATE OF KENTUCKY, OFFSHORE OUTSOURCING OF KEN-
TUCKY STATE GOVERNMENT SERVICES: DIRECT CONTRACTING Is LIMITED BUT THE AMOUNT OF
SUBCONTRACTING IS UNKNOWN, RESEARCH REPORT No. 325, at v (2005), available at http://
lrc.ky.gov/lrcpubs/RR325.pdf [hereinafter KENTUCKY REPORT] ("The inability [of Ken-
tucky] to determine whether contracted work is being outsourced overseas is typical of
other states also."); Nancy Hicks, Bill Would Require Contractors to Reveal Their Overseas Deals,
LINCOLNJ. STAR (Neb.), Feb. 14, 2008, at B2, LexisNexis Academic ("[N]o one seems to
know how much business, paid for with state tax dollars, is conducted [overseas]."); How
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aware of the use of offshore labor in state contracts, 3' especially if it
results from offshore subcontracting.32 Notwithstanding the lack of
data, it is clear that a majority of states have contracts with vendors
that use offshore labor to provide state services,3 3 although the extent
of such offshoring varies widely by state.3 4 The discussion that follows
addresses the scope of state offshore contracting through anecdotal
press accounts, research studies, and government reports.
One of the most informative reports on state offshore contracting
(albeit limited in scope) comes from the Government Accountability
Office (GAO) .35 In 2006, the GAO investigated the extent of offshor-
ing in certain state human-services programs, ostensibly because the
programs implicated federal dollars.3 6 The GAO concluded that a
majority of states have offshore contracts related to four programs:
Child Support Enforcement, Food Stamp, Temporary Assistance for
Needy Families (TANF), and Unemployment Insurance. 37 Offshoring
was most pervasive in Food Stamp and TANF programs, in which
thirty-one and sixteen states respectively had offshore contracts, while
twelve states had offshore Child Support Enforcement contracts, and
seven states had offshore Unemployment Insurance contracts.3 8
In total, the GAO found that states annually spent $335 million-
or 18 percent-of annual contract expenditures on offshore con-
tracting related to the four programs, 39 although the data has limita-
tions.40  In the Food Stamp and TANF programs, states most
frequently offshored customer service functions, while in the Unem-
ployment Insurance and Child Support Enforcement programs, states
Many Jobs Are Involved?, PUBLIC CITIZEN, http://www.citizen.org/trade/offshoring/jobs
(last visited Sept. 20, 2008).
31 See, e.g., E-mail from Jeff T. Holden, Dir., Office of Procurement Mgmt., S.D., to
author (Oct. 9, 2007, 09:01:05 EDT) (on file with author) ("We do not currenly have
anything in state law or our contracts that requires a contractor to identify where they will
perform the work related to a state contract.").
32 See, e.g., infra note 63 and accompanying text.
33 See generally GAO OFFSHORING REPORT, supra note 1 (finding that a majority of states
had offshore contracts in certain human services programs); MATTERA ET AL., supra note 3.
34 Compare E-mail from Carol Wilson, Dir. of Procurement, Dep't of Admin. Serv.,
Conn., to author (Oct. 9, 2007, 08:01:13 EDT) (on file with author) (stating that offshor-
ing "affects just about every state contract"), with E-mail from Chris Howe, Dir., Div. of
Purchases, Kan., to author (Oct. 8, 2007, 10:20:33 EDT) (on file with author) (stating that
offshoring "may appear on fewer than 5 transactions per year").
-35 GAO OFFSHOR1NG REPORT, supra note 1.
36 See id. at 1-2, 6.
37 See id. at 3.
38 See id. at 12-13.
39 See id. at 3.
40 The total magnitude of state spending on offshore contracts is difficult to quantify
because many states classify contracts as offshore even when the contractor will not per-
form them exclusively offshore. See id. at 14. Further complicating this situation is some
states' failure to maintain accurate records; the GAO found offshore state contracting in
five states that reported no offshoring. See id. at 10-11.
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most frequently offshored IT functions. 4 1 "[S] tate officials rarely con-
tracted directly with foreign companies"; instead, offshoring generally
occurred when state contractors either hired foreign subcontractors
or used their own offshore operations. 42 India and Mexico were the
most common offshore contract locations, but the GAO also docu-
mented offshore work in Argentina, Canada, Chile, France, Ireland,
Poland, and Spain. 43
Beyond this GAO report, newspaper articles seem to provide end-
less anecdotal evidence of state offshore contracting. The Charlotte Ob-
server, for instance, reported that U.S. state-run call centers located in
foreign nations are a "little-known but widespread government use of
a controversial cost-cutting tactic."'44 A study by that newspaper found
that nearly every state is engaged in offshoring, including South Caro-
lina, which awarded a $2.5 million contract to a firm that planned to
use workers in India to build a state unemployment tax system.45 Sim-
ilarly, the Rutland Herald reported that Pennsylvania contractor Cit-
icorp Electronic Financial Services hired workers in India and Mexico
to operate a state welfare call center.46 In another example, accord-
ing to the Lincoln Journal Star, Nebraska contractor J.P. Morgan em-
ploys offshore workers in India and Mexico to handle about 3,500
state food stamp calls per month, as part of a $600,000 state con-
tract. 47 Nebraska also has contracts with other private IT companies,
like Microsoft and IBM, that perform state services in foreign coun-
tries including Argentina and Columbia.4 8
In Georgia, according to the Atlanta Journal-Constitution, the Gov-
ernor recently announced that the state would outsource much of its
technology infrastructure. 49 The Georgia Technology Authority is
tasked with contracting out nearly $600 million of state spending.50
The State expects outsourcing to increase efficiency and accordingly
plans to layoff 200 workers and transfer hundreds of others to private
employers. 51 In the process, the Governor will not limit bidding to
41 See id. at 17-20.
42 See id. at 10.
43 See id. at 21-22.
44 Hopkins, supra note 3, at IA.
45 Id.
46 See Fernandez & Von Bergen, supra note 21.
47 Hicks, supra note 30. For other anecdotal evidence of state offshore call-centers,
see Amy Joi Bryson, Firm Is Asked to End India Outsourcing, DESERET MORNING NEWS (Salt
Lake City), Mar. 24, 2004, LexisNexis Academic; Karen Imas, SendingJobs Overseas: A Grow-
ing Policy Debate in the Public Sector, MONTHLY ISSUE BRIEF (The Council of State Gov'ts/E.
Regional Conf., New York, N.Y.), Oct., 2003, at 2-3.
48 See Hicks, supra note 30.
49 James Salzer, Offshoing: New Tech Program Will Force Layoffs, ATLANTrAJ.-CONST., Dec.
12, 2007, at ID, LexisNexis Academic.
50 See id.
51 See id.
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U.S. businesses; the State will consider vendors who provide the best
value, which may include offshore contractors.52
One of the most remarkable examples of state government off-
shoring comes from Indiana. The Fort Wayne Journal-Gazette revealed
that the Indiana Department of Workforce Development-the state
agency responsible for helping unemployed residents find jobs-
awarded a $15.2 million contract to India-based Tata Consultancy Ser-
vices Ltd. to upgrade the agency's computers. 53 The agreement called
for the contractor to secure temporary work visas for sixty-five Indian
contractors to work alongside eighteen Indiana workers. 54 Although
Tata's contract bid was approximately $8 million less than the next
lowest bid, the Governor cancelled the contract after its details be-
came public. 55
In Massachusetts, according to the Boston Herald, the issue of state
offshore contracting led to a public fight between the state's senior
U.S. senator, Ted Kennedy, and its then-governor, Mitt Romney.56
Kennedy, upon learning that Massachusetts's state contractor J.P.
Morgan Chase used workers in India to process state Medicaid data
and answer questions about the state's food stamp program, criticized
Romney for "'jumping on the offshoring bandwagon." 57 This was
not Massachusetts's first foray into offshoring: the State Teachers' Re-
tirement Board previously awarded a $3 million contract to an infor-
mation management company that performed work in India for the
Board. 58
Additionally, state-government reports offer some insight into
state offshoring practices. The Tennessee Legislature estimates that it
spends at least $45 million annually on offshore contracts. 59 The Cali-
fornia State Auditor reports that 185 state contracts totaling $638.9
million may have been performed offshore. The extent of Califor-
52 See id.
53 Labor Agency Taps India Firm for State Project, FT. WAYNEJ.-GAZETrE, Sept. 30, 2003, at
9, LexisNexis Academic.
54 Id.
55 The Governor's cancellation was not welcomed by everyone. Compare THOMAS L.
FRIEDMAN, THE WORLD Is FLAT: A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE TwENTY-FIRsT CENTURY 207 (2005)
("The deal would greatly benefit... some Indiana tech workers; and it would save Indiana
state residents precious tax dollars that could be deployed to hire more state work-
ers... ."), with Lou DOBBS, EXPORTING AMERICA: WHY CORPORATE GREED IS SHIPPING AMERI-
CAN JOBS OvERsEAs 35 (2004) ("[T]he taxpayers of Indiana ... would have preferred that
their tax dollars be used to help those out-of work Indiana residents find jobs.").
56 See Rothstein, supra note 5, at 6.
57 Id. (quoting U.S. Sen. Ted Kennedy).
58 See MATTERA ET AL., supra note 3, at 16.
59 FISCAL NoTE, H.B. 870 & S.B. 1113, 105th Gen. Sess., 1st. Sess. (Tenn. 2007), avail-
able at http://www.legislature.state.tn.us/bills/currentga/Fiscal/HB0870.pdf (noting that
Tennessee spends 10 percent of $3 billion service contract expenditures on IT services, 15
percent of which are performed offshore).
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nia's offshore contracting, though, remains unclear because state
agencies are neither required to track nor report the extent of off-
shore contracting. 60 The Nebraska Legislature found that the State
hired a German company to manage its accounting system and that
the Nebraska Employee Retirement System employs an offshore
worker to maintain its computer systems. 6' Minnesota estimates that
it directly spends 0.42 percent of professional/technical contract
funds on offshore contracting. 62 Kentucky reports that it has spent
$5.67 million on offshoring contracting since 1999, but that the actual
number is likely higher because the State does not know the extent of
its offshore subcontracting. 63
While states' offshore contracting most often steals the headlines,
city governments are not immune from offshoring. In 2002, the New
York Times reported that workers in Ghana process New York City envi-
ronmental citations. 64 The City awarded a contract to Delaware-based
Data Management Internationale to transcribe handwritten citations
into a digital database .65 The contractor subcontracted the work to
Ghana, where its typists typically earn about $70 per month, about
three times the Ghanaian minimum wage. 66 City officials, who claim
they didn't know where the contractor would perform the contract
and have since moved the work back into the United States, had previ-
ously contracted with a Michigan-based firm that transcribed the cita-
tions in India and Mexico.
67
C. The Outsourcing Controversy of 2004 and The Rise of State
Offshore Contracting Restrictions
The debate over offshore contracting took center stage during
the 2004 election season.68 A study notes that interest in outsourcing
60 CAL. STATE AUDITOR, THE STATE'S OFFSHORE CONTRACTING: UNCERTAINTY EXISTS
ABOUT ITS PREVALENCE AND EFFECTS, Report No. 2004-115, in IMPLEMENTATION OF STATE
AUDITOR'S RECOMMENDATIONS: AUDITS RELEASED IN JANUARY 2004 THROUGH DECEMBER
2005, Report No. 2006-406R 89, 89-90 (2006) [hereinafter CAL. AUDITOR REPORT].
61 FISCAL NOTE, L.B. 87, 99th Sess., Reg. Sess. (Neb. 2007), available at http://
uniweb.legislature.ne.gov/FloorDocs/Current/PDF/FN/LB87.pdf.
62 Memorandum from Dana B. Badgerow, Comm'r of the Dep't of Admin., Minn. to
Tim Pawlenty, Governor, Minn. 1 (Feb. 21, 2007) (on file with author).
63 KENTUCKY REPORT, supra note 30.
64 Robert F. Worth, In New York Tickets, Ghana Sees Orderly City, N.Y. TIMES (late ed.),
July 22, 2002, at Al ("If you are caught playing your radio too loudly in Times Square,
selling ice cream while parked in a Harlem crosswalk or dumping your kitchen trash in
Prospect Park, your ticket does not just go to City Hall to be processed. It goes to
Ghana.").
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 See Mankiw & Swagel, supra note 6, at 4-5; Carolyn Said, Hot-Button Issue Makes for
Lively Debate Along the Campaign Trail: Federal, State Lawmakers Seek to Regulate Sending Jobs
Overseas, S. F. CHRON., Mar. 7, 2004, at 15.
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"exploded" during the election, with media references to outsourcing
in four major newspapers more than tripling during that period.69 A
crucial point in this offshoring debate was the release of the 2004 Eco-
nomic Report of the President, which reported that it "makes more
sense" to import cheaper foreign goods and services rather than pro-
duce them domestically. 70 Many took exception to the President's
perceived support of offshoring, and the President's chief economic
adviser ignited further controversy when he characterized offshoring
as 'just a new way of doing international trade." 71 U.S. Senator John
Kerry seized upon the controversy when he promised to repeal every
incentive that "entices any Benedict Arnold company or CEO to take
the money and the jobs overseas. '72
State lawmakers began to react to the growing public debate over
offshoring by taking action to restrict offshore state contracting.73
These actions have taken many forms, including offshore state con-
tract bans,74 state contract preferences for in-state vendors, 75 and dis-
69 See Mankiw & Swagel, supra note 6, at 4-5.
70 2004 ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 19, at 229.
71 Jonathan Weisman, Bush, Adviser Assailed for Stance on 'Offshoring'Jobs, WASH. POST,
Feb. 11, 2004, at A6 (quoting N. Gregory Mankiw). For a sampling of controversy that
erupted, see, for example, Press Release, U.S. Rep. Marion Berry, Berry Calls for Resigna-
tion of Administration Official who Claimed Benefits to Exporting AmericanJobs (Feb. 13,
2004), available at http://www.house.gov/berry/pressreleases/archive/021304Mankiw.
html (calling for Mankiw's resignation); Mike Allen, Hastert Rebukes Bush Adviser; Speaker
Challenges Mankiw's Statements on U.S. Job Loss, WASH. POST, Feb. 12, 2004, at A17 ("'I under-
stand that Mr. Mankiw is a brilliant economic theorist, but his theory fails a basic test of
real economics."' (quoting then-Speaker of the House Dennis Hastert)).
72 Barry Shlachter, Kerry's Offshoring Plan Being Questioned, FT. WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM,
Oct. 21, 2004, at Cl.
73 See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
74 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:34-13.2 (West 2005); S.B. 2385, 2008 Leg., Jan. Sess.
(R.I. 2008) ("The state or any municipality shall not award a procurement contract for
goods and services to be rendered or supplied by a vendor or contractor located outside
the United States."); H.B. 32, 24th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2007); L.B. 87, 100th Leg., 1st
Sess. (Neb. 2007) (requiring all state service contracts to be awarded to U.S. companies to
perform work in the U.S.); S.B. 4077, 213th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2007) (requiring certain
state contracts to include clause mandating all services under contract must be performed
within U.S.); Keep Jobs in Tennessee Act, H.B. 870, 105th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess.
(Tenn. 2007); Keep jobs in West Virginia Act, H.B. 2389, 77th Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va.
2007); S.B. 1266, 47th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2005). This category also includes legisla-
tion that requires a state contractor to employ workers who are authorized to work in the
United States. See, e.g., H.B. 692, 94th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2007) (requiring all
state service contracts to include a clause that mandates that employees of contractors and
subcontractors must be U.S. citizens); S.B. 234, 114th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind.
2005) (requiring state contractors to file an affidavit stating that each individual perform-
ing the state contract is authorized to work in the United States); H.B. 2207, 75th Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2005).
75 See, e.g., 30 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 517/10 (West 2005) (requiring state purchasing
agencies to give preference to domestic products); L.B. 87, 100th Leg., 1st Sess. (Neb.
2007) (giving preference to Nebraska-based companies as part of a requirement that state
contractors perform services in the United States); Ind. Exec. Order No. 05-05 (2005),
174
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qualifying enterprises from certain state benefits because of unrelated
offshoring activities. 76 This Note does not specifically address indirect
forms of offshoring legislation, but they include restrictions on send-
ing data overseas, 77 directives to study the issue of offshoring,78 and
contractor disclosure requirements. 79 Although many have raised
constitutional concerns about state offshore contracting restrictions,8 0
a topic this Note addresses,8 1 states continue to forge ahead with legis-
lation to restrict offshoring.8 2
In December 2003, offshoring legislation had appeared before
only four state legislatures; by early 2004, nearly 100 such bills were
pending in state legislatures across the nation. 83 And by the end of
2004, that number grew to more than 200 bills in over forty states.8 4
Five of those bills became law, including a Tennessee statute authoriz-
ing state officials to implement preferences for service contracts that
would be performed within the United States.8 5  Then, during
available at http://www.in.gov/gov/files/EO-05-05-Buy_lndiana.pdf (establishing the
preference for in-state goods).
76 See, e.g., H.B. 568, 95th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2007) (disqualifying an
entity from state contract awards if it "has or uses a foreign call service center"); Job Preser-
vation Act of 2007, S.B. 1255, 95th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (I1. 2007) (disqualifying
companies that lose 100 or more employees due to outsourcing from receiving certain
state benefits, including procurement contracts); H.B. 129, 2007 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.H.)
(prohibiting companies that have outsourced fifty or more New Hampshire jobs from bid-
ding on state contracts); H.B. 389, 2007 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2007) (disqualifying from
state contracts those contractors who have offshoringjobs within the past three years from
bidding on state contracts).
77 See, e.g., CAL. ELEC. CODE § 2188.5 (West 2007) (prohibiting voter information from
being sent outside the United States); H.B. 2836, 74th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2007) (mandat-
ing, inter alia, disclosure of call-center location and prohibiting data transfer to foreign
countries).
78 See, e.g., H.B. 5112, 2008 Gen. Assem., Feb. Sess. (Conn.); H.B. 833, 160th Sess.,
Reg. Sess. (N.H. 2007).
79 See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-59.4 (West 2005); H.B. 4100, 94th Leg., Ist Reg. Sess.
(Mich. 2007); S.B. 861, 2007 Sess., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2007).
80 See, e.g., CAL. AUDITOR REPORT, supra note 60, at 92; NFAP REPORT, supra note 7, at
3 (noting that California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger vetoed five state offshoring
bills, announcing: "There is a right way and a wrong way to expand economic opportunity
in California. The wrong approach is to implement measures that restrict trade, invite
retaliation or violate the United States Constitution or our foreign trade agreements.")
(citation omitted); STATE OF WASH., JOINT TASK FORCE ON STATE CONTRACTS 9-10 (2007);
SHANNON KLINGER & M. LYNN SYKES, NAT'L FOUND. FOR Am. POLICY, EXPORTING THE LAW: A
LEGAL ANALYSIS OF STATE AND FEDERAL OUTSOURCING LEGISLATION 2-3 (2004), http://
www.nfap.net/researchactivities/studies/NFAPStudyExportingLaw_0404.pdf.
81 See infra Part III.
82 See generally NFAP REPORT, supra note 7.
83 Id. at 2.
84 Id.
85 TENN. CODE ANN § 12-4-109(e) (West 2004). This statute was the first in the nation
to give businesses an incentive not to offshore work. See Tenn. Governor Signs Anti-Outsourc-
ing Bill, CHI. SUN-TIMES, May 17, 2004, at 40. But, as of mid-2007, Tennessee had not
implemented any of the preferences that the statute authorized. See E-mail from Robert
Barlow, Office of Contracts Review, Tenn., to author (Oct. 16, 2007, 10:53:06 EDT).
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2005-2006, state lawmakers introduced approximately 190 bills on the
subject of offshoring,86 ten of which became law.87 Several more
passed state legislatures but were met with vetoes. 88 Among the new
laws were Colorado, Illinois, and North Dakota statutes giving prefer-
ence to domestic products,8 9 a North Carolina contract location dis-
closure law,90 and New Jersey's infamous Senate Bill 494, a highly
restrictive offshore contract ban.91 New Jersey State Senator Shirley
Turner introduced the bill after learning that the private contractor
administering New Jersey's welfare benefits had moved the state cus-
tomer-service call-center to India.92
During 2006-2007, although the number of bills state legislators
introduced declined, significant state legislative action aimed at re-
stricting offshoring continued.93 As of April 2007, more than forty
offshoring bills were pending in state legislatures, 94 including a New
York bill that would require contractors to perform state service con-
tracts in the United States.95 Legislative activity has also continued
into 2008.96 In the future, state lawmakers are likely to continue re-
stricting offshore state contracting for political and economic reasons,
especially if the economy falters.97
86 See, e.g., S.B. 13, 126th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2005); S.B. 1150, 58th Leg.,
1st Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2005).
87 See NFAP REPORT, supra note 7, at 4 (seven bills restricted offshoring; three estab-
lished commissions to study offshoring).
88 See id. at 3 (including five California bills).
89 See CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 8-18-103 (West 2005); 30 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 517/10
(West 2005); N.D. CENr. CODE § 44-08-01.1 (2005).
90 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-59.4 (West 2005).
91 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:34-13.2 (West 2005).
92 Imas, supra note 47, at 2-3.
93 See NFAP REPORT, supra note 7, at 5; Richard Raysman & Peter Brown, Anti-Out-
sourcing Legislation: A Brief Summaiy, 238 N.Y.L.J. 3, 3 (2007); Bob Sanders, Lawmakers Face a
Slew of Labor-Related Measures, N.H. Bus. REv., Feb. 2, 2007, at 1.
94 See NFAP REPORT, supra note 7, at 5 (noting that as of April 10, 2007, state legisla-
tors had introduced forty-one offshoring bills).
95 S.B. 4077, 213th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2007).
96 See, e.g., H.B. 269, 25th Leg., 2d Sess. (Ala. 2008) ("The state shall procure only
United States flags or Alaska flags that are manufactured in the United States."); S.B. 1249,
48th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2008) ("A state governmental unit shall not award a contract
or development assistance to a vendor, bidder, contractor or subcontractor or an applicant
for development assistance that performs the work at a site outside of the United States.");
H.B. 5112, 2008 Gen. Assem., Feb. Sess. (Conn. 2008) (requiring the state, inter alia, to
identify offshore contracting and for vendors to disclosure offshore performance); H.B.
1613, 94th Gen. Assem., 2nd Sess. (Mo. 2008) (suggesting that the state should prohibit
offshore contracting to mitigate the impact of international trade); L.B. 869, 100th Leg.,
2d Sess. (Neb. 2008) (creating a disclosure requirement); S.B. 2385, 2008 Gen. Assem.,
Jan. Sess., (R.I. 2008); see also Jobs & Trade Act, A.B. 8567, 230th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y.
2007) (suggesting that the state should prohibit offshore contracting to mitigate the im-
pact of international trade).
97 SeeJim Small, Bill Bans Arizona Contracts to Firms that Outsource to Foreign Companies,
ARIz. CAPITOL TIMES, Feb. 1, 2008, LexisNexis Academic. In Arizona, for example, State
Representative David Schapira is against offshoring because he believes it will eventually
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State legislatures are not the only government branches taking
issue with offshoring; a handful of governors have issued executive
orders limiting public sector offshoring. On August 31, 2007, the
Governor of Idaho barred state contractors from offshoring American
jobs.98 Citing the possibility that offshoring may decrease state reve-
nue and create unemployment, the Governor ordered potential state
vendors to disclose the location in which the vendor or its subcontrac-
tor intends to perform any state service contract.9 9 The Governor also
prohibited state officials from awarding service contracts to vendors
who planned to perform state contracts outside of the United
States. 100
Similarly, in 2004 the Governor of Alaska ordered the State Exec-
utive Branch to ensure that service contracts are performed in the
United States. 10 ' Pursuant to that order, the State's Division of Gen-
eral Services now requires state service contracts above $25,000 to be
performed domestically. 10 2 Other states that have executive orders in
force on the subject of offshoring include Indiana,10 3 Michigan,' 0 4
Missouri, 10 5 North Carolina, 10 6 and Pennsylvania.' 0 7 At least one
state, West Virginia, has restricted offshore contracting in the absence
of legislative or executive action. 108
II
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON STATE POWER
A. The Foreign Commerce Clause
1. Overview of Foreign Commerce Power
Against this backdrop, this Note turns to the Foreign Commerce
Clause. 10 9 Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution grants Congress the
affirmative power "[t] o Regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and
result in lostjobs, stating, "Especially with the economy in the state its in right now, the fear
is the next piece may be job loss. I don't want to see that happen in Arizona." Id.
98 Idaho Exec. Order No. 2007-09 (2007); Press Release, Office of Governor of Idaho,
Governor Protects Idaho Jobs from Outsourcing (Aug. 31, 2007), available at http://
gov.idaho.gov/mediacenter/press/pr2007/praug07/pr_070.html.
99 Idaho Exec. Order No. 2007-09 (2007).
100 Id.
101 Alaska Admin. Order No. 216 (2004), available at http://www.gov.state.ak.us/ad-
min-orders/216.html.
102 Div. oF FIN., ALASKA. DEP'T OF ADMIN., ALAsKA ADMIN. MANUAL 81.015 (2007), avail-
able at http://fin.admin.state.ak.us/dof/akadminmanual/resource/81.pdf.
103 Ind. Exec. Order No. 05-05 (2005).
104 Mich. Exec. Directive No. 2004-3 (2004).
105 Mo. Exec. Order No. 04-09 (2004).
106 N.C. Exec. Order No. 60 (2004).
107 Pa. Exec. Order No. 2006-08 (2006).
108 See E-mail from David Tincher, Dir., Purchasing Div., W. Va., to author (Oct. 29,
2007, 11:21:53 EDT) (on file with author).
109 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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among the Several States, and with the Indian Tribes."'110 These
words represent one of the most expansive powers of the federal gov-
ernment."1 ' The Commerce Clause subjects virtually all commercial
intercourse to national control.' 12 This Clause was largely borne out
of the drafters' desire to control the hostile economic relationships
that had existed between the States under the Articles of Confedera-
tion.113 The drafters also recognized the need for uniform foreign
trade regulations in the aftermath of the Revolutionary War." 4 Al-
though the text of the Commerce Clause might suggest that the scope
of the three enumerated commerce powers is coextensive,' 15 the Su-
preme Court in Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles announced
"there is evidence that the founders intended the scope of the foreign
commerce power to be greater."' 1 6
The reach of the foreign commerce power is distinctively
broad. 1 7 In its early years, the Supreme Court opined that the For-
eign Commerce Clause "comprehend[s] every species of commercial
110 Id. The Commerce Clause is divided into three parts: the Intrastate Commerce
Clause, the Foreign Commerce Clause, and the Indian Commerce Clause. See generally
BORIS I. BIrTKER, BITTKER ON THE REGULATION OF INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE
(1999).
]]I See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 5 (2005) (holding that Congress's commerce
power extends to criminalization of intrastate, noncommercial cultivation of medical mari-
juana); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258 (1964) (upholding
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 on Commerce Clause grounds); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S.
111, 128-29 (1942) (holding that the commerce power extends to the imposition of wheat
quotas on farmers because the cumulative effect of local consumption affects interstate
commerce); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 66-67 (1824) (opining that com-
merce includes all "commercial intercourse"); United States v. Clark, 435 F.3d 1100 (9th
Cir. 2006) (holding that the commerce power extends to criminalization of international
travel to engage in an unlawful sex act).
112 See, e.g., cases cited supra note 111.
113 See Seelig v. Baldwin, 7 F. Supp. 776, 780 (S.D.N.Y. 1934) (opining that the drafters
wanted to end "the mutual jealousies and aggression of the states, taking form in customs
barriers and other economic retaliation"); Kenton R. O'Neil, Comment, "Buy American"
Statutes: Should the Market Participant Doctrine Shield Pennsylvania's Steel Products Procurement
Act from Commerce Clause Scrutiny?, 96 DICK L. REV. 519, 524 (1992) ("The drafters of the
Clause decided that the source of the problems of the Articles of Confederation stemmed
from state governments which had been too responsive to local economic interests in the
absence of a central government capable of economically unifying the several states.") (ci-
tation omitted).
114 See Robert J. Delahunty, Federalism Beyond the Water's Edge: State Procurement Sanctions
and Foreign Affairs, 37 STAN. J. INr'L L. 1, 16-26 (2001).
115 See generally Saikrishna Prakash, Our Three Commerce Clauses and the Presumption of
Intrasentence Uniformity, 55 ARK. L. Rv. 1149 (2003).
116 441 U.S. 434, 448 (1979); accordPrakash, supranote 115, at 1149 ("[O]ne might say
that thereis only one power-the power to regulate commerce-that applies [in all] three
situations.").
117 See United Statesv. Clark, 435 F.3d 1100, 1113 (9th Cir. 2006) ("Born largely from a
desire for uniform rules governing commercial relations with foreign countries, the Su-
preme Court has read the Foreign Commerce Clause as granting Congress sweeping
powers.").
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intercourse between the United States and foreign nations." 118 The
Court has never struck down a congressional act as exceeding its for-
eign commerce power, 119 nor do federalism constraints burden the
foreign commerce power.120 The Foreign Commerce Clause further
appears to be immune from two recent Supreme Court cases limiting
the scope of Congress's interstate commerce powert-21-United States
v. Lopez122 and United States v. Morrison.123
Sitting in the shadow of this expansive federal foreign commerce
power is the dormant foreign commerce power.124 The so-called dor-
mant Foreign Commerce Clause, although not found in the actual
text of the Constitution, 125 places constitutional limits on states' ability
to regulate foreign commerce.126 Based on the premise that Congress
has the "exclusive" power to regulate foreign commerce, 127 the dor-
mant Foreign Commerce Clause acts "as a self-executing limitation on
the power of the States to" substantially burden foreign commerce, 128
even in the absence of explicit Congressional preemption. 29 The
dormant nature of the commerce power effectuates the national pol-
icy of preventing the "economic balkanization" of the nation "into
118 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 193-94 (1824).
119 See Clark, 435 F.3d at 1113.
120 See Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 448 n.13 (noting that "[i]t has never been suggested that
Congress' power to regulate foreign commerce could be... limited" by the constraints of
federalism); Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ill. v. United States, 289 U.S. 48, 57 (1933) ("The
principle of duality in our system of government does not touch the authority of Congress
in the regulation of foreign commerce.").
121 See Clark, 435 F.3d at 1111; Prakash, supra note 115, at 1166-67.
122 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (invalidating the Gun Free School Zone Act of 1990 as exceed-
ing Congress's commerce power because the statute encroached on state police powers).
123 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (invalidating the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 as ex-
ceeding Congress's commerce power because it was not directed at instrumentalities, chan-
nels, or goods involved in intestate commerce).
124 See generally Bi-r-raR, supra note 110, § 6.
125 See, e.g., C & A Carbone, Inc., v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 401 (1994)
(O'Connor, J., concurring) ("The scope of the dormant Commerce Clause is a judicial
creation."); Prakash, supra note 115, at 1169 (highlighting that the Dormant Commerce
Clause is a creature of Constitutional interpretation performed by courts and that the re-
suiting jurisprudence is "very complicated and byzantine.").
126 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid
Waste Mgmt. Auth., 127 S. Ct. 1786, 1793 (2007). But see Camps Newfound/Owatonna,
Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 610 (1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("The negative
Commerce Clause has no basis in the text of the Constitution, makes little sense, and has
proved virtually unworkable in application.").
127 See Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ill. v. United States, 289 U.S. 48, 56-57 (1933) ("It is an
essential attribute of the [foreign commerce] power that it is exclusive and plenary. As an
exclusive power, its exercise may not be limited, qualified or impeded to any extent by state
action.").
128 S.-Cent. Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 87 (1984).
129 See United Haulers Ass'n, 127 S. Ct. at 1792; Hon. Sandra L. Lynch, Judge, U.S. Cir.
Ct., The United States, the States, and Foreign Relations, Address at Suffolk University Law
School (Feb. 17, 2000), in 33 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 217, 225 (2000).
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fifty separate and impenetrable markets. '1 3 0 It also relieves the fed-
eral government of the burden of policing state regulation and rescu-
ing states from foreign policy problems that might arise because of
state regulation of foreign commerce.13'
2. Standard to Evaluate State Regulation of Foreign Commerce
a. Traditional Commerce Clause Standard
Lower courts borrow the dormant Interstate Commerce Clause
standard to adjudicate challenges to state regulation of foreign com-
merce because the Supreme Court's dormant Foreign Commerce
Clause jurisprudence is relatively undeveloped.13 2 In the interstate
context, courts are highly skeptical of state regulation that discrimi-
nates against interstate commerce, 33 in which "'discrimination' sim-
ply means differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state economic
interests that benefits the former and burdens the latter."134 Accord-
ingly, state measures that facially discriminate against interstate or for-
eign commerce are subject to strict scrutiny.' 3 5 In Philadelphia v. New
Jersey, the Court struck down New Jersey's prohibition on out-of-state
trash shipments into the State, holding that a state may not solve a
legitimate public policy problem by erecting barriers to trade. 136 Sim-
ilarly, the Court has invalidated as facially discriminatory Iowa's less
favorable treatment of dividends from a foreign subsidiary of a corpo-
ration that has both domestic and foreign operations.13 7
The strict scrutiny applied to facially discriminatory state regula-
tion of interstate or foreign commerce largely depends on the nature
of the state action. On the one hand, the Supreme Court has applied
130 Trojan Techs., Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 916 F.2d 903, 909 (3d Cir. 1990).
131 See Lynch, supra note 129, at 225.
132 See, e.g., Piazza's Seafood World, LLC v. Odom, 448 F.3d 744, 749-50 (5th Cir.
2006) (applying interstate dormant commerce framework to dormant foreign commerce
challenge); Antilles Cement Corp. v. Acevedo Vila, 408 F.3d 41, 46 (1st Cir. 2005) ("Al-
though the language of dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence most often concerns
interstate commerce, essentially the same doctrine applies to international commerce.").
Most of the Court's dormant Foreign Commerce Clause jurisprudence concerns taxation.
See, e.g., Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298 (1994); Itel Containers Int'l
Corp. v. Huddleston, 507 U.S. 60 (1993); Wardair Can. Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Revenue, 477
U.S. 1 (1986); Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159 (1983); Japan
Line, Ltd. v. County of L.A., 441 U.S. 434 (1979).
133 See, e.g., United Haulers Ass'n, 127 S. Ct. at 1793.
134 Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994).
135 See Kraft Gen. Foods, Inc. v. Iowa Dep't of Revenue and Fin., 505 U.S. 71, 81-82
(1992); Philadelphia v. NewJersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978); Nat'l Foreign Trade Council
v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 66-67 (1st Cir. 1999) ("Under standard Commerce Clause analysis,
a statute that facially discriminates against interstate or foreign commerce will, in most
cases, be found unconstitutional."), affd in result sub nom. Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade
Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000).
136 437 U.S. 617.
137 Kraft Gen. Foods, 505 U.S. at 92.
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a "virtually per se rule of invalidity" to state policies that are motivated
by "simple economic protectionism,"1 38 such as laws that explicitly
block the flow of commerce at the states' borders. 13 9 This is especially
true if states require "business operations to be performed in the
home State that could more efficiently be performed elsewhere. 1 4 °
On the other hand, not all facial discrimination is protectionist, and
the Court has carved out a narrow exception for facial discrimination
that serves "legitimate local purposes that could not adequately be
served by available nondiscriminatory alternatives.' ' 41 In Maine v.
Taylor, the Court upheld Maine's facially discriminatory policy of
prohibiting the importation of out-of-state baitfish because the fish
threatened the state's local environment. 142 Nonetheless, the Court
has narrowly construed this exception, noting that "[s]hielding in-
state industries from out-of-state competition is almost never a legiti-
mate local purpose."' 4 3
Even if it is not facially discriminatory, a state regulation with the
purpose or effect of discriminating against interstate or foreign com-
merce is met with heightened scrutiny. 144 In these situations, the state
bears the burden ofjustifying its regulation "both in terms of the local
benefits . . . and the unavailability of nondiscriminatory alternatives
adequate to preserve the local interests at stake. ' 145 However, if the
state regulates "even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public
interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental,
[the regulation] will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such
commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local
benefits."146
138 Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. at 624.
139 Id.
14o Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 145 (1970) ("Even where the state is
pursuing a clearly legitimate local interest, this particular burden on commerce has been
declared virtually per se illegal."); see also Philadelphia v. NewJersey, 437 U.S. at 624; Piazza's
Seafood World, LLC v. Odom, 448 F.3d 744, 750 (5th Cir. 2006) (holding that a Louisiana
catfish labeling statute that prevented foreign fish from being labeled as "catfish" is per se
invalid because it facially discriminates against foreign commerce).
141 Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 151 (1986).
142 Id. at 151.
143 Id. at 148.
144 See Hunt v. Wash. Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977). Washington Apple
involved a dormant Commerce Clause challenge to North Carolina's prohibition on the
importation of non-USDA certified apples. Id. at 336-42. The Court found that the practi-
cal effect of this regulation was to discriminate against Washington apples, which were not
USDA-certified but rather certified by Washington under its higher standards. Id. at
351-52; see also Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951) (striking down
regulations that milk had to be processed near the city of Madison because other less
restrictive alternatives exist to protect health and safety).
145 Wash. Apple, 432 U.S. at 353.
146 Pike, 397 U.S. at 142 (invalidating a California regulation requiring farmers to pack
cantaloupes locally).
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b. "One Voice" Test ofJapan Line
State power to regulate foreign commerce is further constrained
by the "special need for federal uniformity" and requires a broader
constitutional inquiry. 147 In Japan Line, the Supreme Court invali-
dated a California property tax as applied to a foreign corporation
under the Foreign Commerce Clause.' 48 In doing so, Japan Line an-
nounced a new standard: state regulation of foreign commerce is un-
constitutional if it either results in multiple taxation or frustrates
federal uniformity and prevents the nation from "'speaking with one
voice' in its commercial relations with foreign nations. 149 A state
frustrates national uniformity by inviting international disputes or re-
taliation, the latter being particularly troublesome because the entire
nation may suffer as a result of the actions of one state. 150
Applying this test, the Japan Line Court held that the California
tax ran counter to national policy, as reflected in the nation's treaty
obligations. 51 The Court was concerned about the "acute" risk of for-
eign retaliation against the United States and the possibility of other
states enacting similar taxes, which "would make 'speaking with one
voice' impossible." 152 The Court opined that even slight state regula-
tion of foreign commerce assumes significance because it concerns
important matters of international relations. 153 Disposing of Califor-
nia's policy arguments, the Court wrote that these are "problems that
admit only of a federal remedy.' '1 54
The Court built upon its Japan Line jurisprudence in Container
Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Board.155 There, the Court held that
California's unitary business tax based on worldwide business taking
place in California did not violate the Foreign Commerce Clause. 156
The Court distinguished state regulations that have mere "foreign
resonances" from those that "implicate foreign affairs," opining that
the latter violates the Foreign Commerce Clause "if it either implicates
foreign policy issues which must be left to the Federal Government or
147 Wardair Can., Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Revenue, 477 U.S. 1, 8 (1986); seeJapan Line,
Ltd. v. County of L.A., 441 U.S. 434, 448 (1979) (opining that foreign commerce is a "mat-
ter of national concern," and that "'with respect to foreign intercourse and trade the peo-
ple of the United States act through a single government'") (citation omitted).
148 Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 434-35; see infra Part IL.B (discussing foreign affairs
preemption).
149 Id. at 451 (citation omitted).
150 Id. at 450.
151 Id. at 452-53.
152 Id. at 453.
153 Id. at 456.
154 Id. at 457.
155 463 U.S. 159, 194 (1983).
156 Id. at 197.
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violates a clear federal directive." 157 In upholding the tax, the Court
thought the remote likelihood of foreign retaliation and the per-
ceived lack of concern from the Executive Branch about the state tax
were particularly important. 158
Although Japan Line and its progeny confronted the issue of taxa-
tion, the "one voice" test also applies to state regulation of other areas
of foreign commerce. 159 For example, in South-Central Timber Develop-
ment, Inc. v. Wunnicke,1 60 the Supreme Court invalidated Alaska's re-
quirement that purchasers of its state timber process the timber
within the state prior to export. 161 Although grounding its ruling in
the Interstate Commerce Clause, the Court was buttressed in its con-
clusion because Alaska's restriction burdened foreign commerce. 162
After noting that state restrictions burdening foreign commerce are
subject to heightened scrutiny, the Court cited Japan Line for the pro-
position that the nation must "speak with one voice" in its foreign
commercial relations. 163
c. Market Participant Exception
In the interstate commerce context, a state may escape dormant
Commerce Clause scrutiny by acting as a so-called "market partici-
pant."' 64 In other words, a state may favor its own residents if it does
so incident to its role as buyer or seller in the market.165 In Reeves, Inc.
v. Stake, for example, the Supreme Court used the market participant
exception to sustain a South Dakota policy of selling cement from
state plants only to state residents. 66 Once state action crosses the
157 Id. at 194.
158 Id. at 195 (noting that the Executive Branch did not file an amicus brief).
159 See, e.g., Piazza's Seafood World, LLC v. Odom, 448 F.3d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 2006)
(Louisiana catfish labeling statute); Antilles Cement Corp. v. Acevedo Vili, 408 F.3d 41 (1st
Cir. 2005) (Puerto Rico Buy American Act); Nat'l Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181
F.3d 38, 68-70 (lst Cir. 1999), affd in result sub nom. Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council,
530 U.S. 363 (2000) (Massachusetts Burma Law); Trojan Techs., Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 916
F.2d 903, 912 (3d Cir. 1990) (Pennsylvania Steel Products Procurement Act); Bd. of Trs. of
the Employee's Ret. Sys. of Bait. v. Mayor & City Council of Bait., 562 A.2d 720 (Md. 1989)
(South Africa divestment ordinance).
160 467 U.S. 82 (1984).
161 See id. at 101.
162 See id. at 100.
163 Id.
164 See Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 437 (1980) ("There is no indication of a
constitutional plan to limit the ability of the States themselves to operate freely in the free
market.").
165 See Wunnicke, 467 U.S. at 93 ("Our cases make clear that if a State is acting as a
market participant, rather than as a market regulator, the dormant Commerce Clause
places no limitation on its activities."); White v. Mass. Council of Constr. Employers, Inc.,
460 U.S. 204, 206 (1983) (holding that Boston was acting as a market participant when it
required its contractors to employ city residents on projects that the city paid for with
public funds).
166 Reeves, 447 U.S. at 446-47.
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line from participation to regulation, however, the state becomes a
"market regulator" and the exception no longer applies. 167 A state
acts as a "market regulator" if its actions have a substantial regulatory
effect outside of the market in which the state is participating. 168 In
Wunnicke, for instance, the Court held that Alaska was acting as a
"market regulator" when it required purchasers of state timber to pro-
cess the timber in Alaska prior to export. 169 Alaska was participating
in the timber market, yet regulating in the processing market, and its
requirement had a substantial downstream regulatory effect on for-
eign commerce with Japan. 1 70
But the market participant exception may not apply to the For-
eign Commerce Clause. The Supreme Court has not decided the is-
sue, leaving commentators and lower courts divided.1 7' The Third
Circuit, in Trojan Technologies, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 72 used the market
participant exception to uphold, against a Foreign Commerce Clause
attack, a Pennsylvania law that required state contractors to use Ameri-
can-made steel on public projects.1 73 In contrast, the First Circuit, in
National Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios,174 argued that the market par-
ticipant exception likely does not apply because of the sensitive for-
eign affairs considerations that arise in the foreign commerce
context.' 7 5 While the Supreme Court has not ruled on the matter, the
Court suggested in Reeves that it would either not apply the exception
or would construe it very narrowly. 76 There, while re-affirming the
distinction between "market participation" and "market regulation,"
the Court included a footnote about state regulation of foreign com-
merce. 177 In this footnote, although the Court had "no occasion to
167 See Wunnicke, 467 U.S. at 93.
168 See Wis. Dep't of Indus., Labor & Human Relations v. Gould Inc., 475 U.S. 282, 289
(1986) (holding that Wisconsin acted as a market regulator by prohibiting state purchases
from violators of federal labor law); Wunnicke, 467 U.S. at 97-98.
169 467 U.S. at 82.
170 Id. at 85 n.4, 100-01.
171 See, e.g., Antilles Cement Corp. v. Acevedo Vila, 408 F.3d 41, 47 (1st Cir. 2005)
(opining that case law on the matter "appears to be in some disarray"); Nat'l Foreign Trade
Council, Inc. v. Giannoulias, 523 F. Supp. 2d 731, 748 (N.D. I11 2007) ("It is not a foregone
conclusion . . . that the market participant exception applies to the Foreign Commerce
Clause. Courts have split on the issue.") (citations omitted);J.T. Hutchens, Note, The Mar-
ket-Participant Exception and the Dormant Foreign Commerce Clause, 5 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL'Y &
ETH[CSJ. 445, 446 (2007). Compare Trojan Techs., Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 916 F.2d 903, 910
(3rd Cir. 1990) (exception applies), and K.S.B. Technical Sales Corp. v. N.J. Dist. Water
Supply Comm'n, 75 N.J. 272, 296 (1977) (same), with Nat'l Foreign Trade Council v. Nat-
sios, 181 F.3d 38, 52 (1st Cir. 1999) (exception likely does not apply), affd in result sub nom.
Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000).
172 916 F.2d at 903.
173 Id. at 904-05.
174 181 F.3d at 38.
175 Id. at 60.
176 Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 437-38 n. 9 (1980).
177 Id.
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explore the limits imposed on state proprietary actions by the 'foreign
commerce' Clause" because the case dealt with interstate commerce,
the Court opined that "Commerce Clause scrutiny may well be more
rigorous when a restraint on foreign commerce is alleged.' ' 78
3. Application of Foreign Commerce Clause to State Offshore
Contracting Restrictions
a. Regulation of and Discrimination Against Foreign Commerce
Under Traditional Commerce Clause Standard
State offshore contract restrictions regulate foreign commerce-
a broad category that includes international trade in services.1 79 By
impeding or blocking the flow of contract funds between state govern-
ments and worksites located in foreign nations, a state undeniably reg-
ulates international trade. Just as the Supreme Court has held that
the flow of value between a U.S. corporation and its foreign subsidies
constitutes foreign commerce, the flow of value between states and
state contractors or subcontractors engaged in offshore operations
constitutes foreign commerce.1 8 0 And state offshoring measures sub-
stantially affect such commerce. 18 1
Not only do state offshore contract restrictions regulate foreign
commerce, they also facially discriminate against such commerce by
treating differently domestic and foreign economic interests. 182 The
text of state offshore contracting bans explicitly prevents state con-
tract funds from entering the stream of foreign commerce. 183 New
178 Id. For further treatment of the market participant exception, see infta Part
II.A.3.c.
179 See Kraft Gen. Foods, Inc. v. Iowa Dep't of Revenue & Fin., 505 U.S. 71, 76 (1992);
United States v. Clark, 435 F.3d 1100, 1115 n.18 (9th Cir. 2006) ("It is now universally
acknowledged that foreign trade or commerce includes both goods and services.") (cita-
tions omitted).
180 See id.
181 Even if a state with minimal offshore contracts restricts offshore contracting, the
restriction would amount to more than an incidental burden on foreign commerce. See
Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of L.A., 441 U.S. 434, 455-56 (1979) (opining that even de
minimis inference in the domestic commerce context assumes significance in the foreign
commerce context); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128-29 (1942) (considering the
cumulative affect of commercial activity); Nat'l Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d
38, 53 (lst Cir. 1999), affd in result sub nom. Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530
U.S. 363 (2000). Cf Bob-Lo Excursion Co. v. Michigan, 333 U.S. 28 (1948) (holding that a
state civil rights statute did not affect foreign commerce because the effect was so minimal
as applied to a Michigan ferry operator that traveled between Detroit and a small Canadian
island).
182 Cf Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994). Offshore
contract restrictions need not discriminate against foreign corporations to discriminate
against foreign commerce. See Natsios, 181 F.3d at 53.
183 See, e.g., Keep Jobs in Tennessee Act, H.B. 870, 105th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess.
(Tenn. 2007) ("Each vendor submitting a bid or contract to provide services and all devel-
opment assistance applicants shall certify that the services covered by the bid, contract or
development assistance will be performed in the United States."); S.B. 4077, 213th Leg.,
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Jersey's contract statute, for instance, mandates that every state service
contract "shall be performed within the United States."18 4 Addition-
ally, state preferences for domestic vendors and disqualification of po-
tential contractors for unrelated offshoring activities facially
discriminate against foreign commerce because they treat vendors en-
gaged in foreign commerce less favorably. 8 5 The legislative intent of
offshore contract restrictions is irrelevant because the measures are
otherwise facially discriminatory: states can always argue that they in-
tended to benefit one party, not burden another. 8 6
To the extent that certain offshore contracting restrictions do not
facially discriminate against foreign commerce, the regulations are
nonetheless motivated by a protectionist purpose. Statements by
lawmakers who support the restrictions show that a major goal of the
measures is to affect contractors' business decisions by not permitting
them to perform state contracts in, or subcontract them to, foreign
work sites. 187 As then-Acting Governor Richard Codey of New Jersey
explained, "[W] e are sending a clear message that if a company wants
to take jobs from our hard working families and send them overseas,
then it will not do business with the state."' 88 Lawmakers similarly use
offshore contracting restrictions to secure domestic or local
benefits.' 8 9
Because state offshore contracting restrictions facially discrimi-
nate against foreign commerce or are motivated by a protectionist
purpose, they are subject to heightened scrutiny under the dormant
Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2007) ("State contracts shall be required to include a provision stating all
services performed under such contract or any subcontract awarded under such contract
shall be performed within the United States."); S.B. 1266, 47th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz.
2005) ("A State agency ... shall not enter into any agreement ... that results in a state
service position being directly or indirectly established or transferred outside of the United
States.").
184 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:34-13.2 (West 2005).
185 See Kraft Gen. Foods, 505 U.S. at 81.
186 See Bacchus Imps., Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 273 (1984) ("A discrimination
claim ... requires a comparison of the two classifications ... It could always be said that
there was no intent to impose a burden on one party, but rather the intent was to confer a
benefit on the other.").
187 See, e.g., Press Release, Office of Governor of N.J., Codey Signs Bill to Protect New
JerseyJobs from Offshore Outsourcing (May 5, 2005); Press Release, Office of Governor of
Mich., Market Denial, Not Market Access, Governor Granholm Joins Rep. Steve Beida to
Keep State ContractingJobs in Michigan, U.S. (Mar. 22, 2004) ("'Today, I have signed two
executive directives that will ensure that Michigan taxpayers are not subsidizing the export
of jobs.'" (quoting Mich. Governor Jennifer M. Granholm)).
188 Press Release, Office of Governor of N.J., supra note 187.
189 See, e.g., William Welsh, Offshore Storm: States Get Tangled in Contractor's Outsourcing
Moves, WASH. TEcH, Apr. 19, 2004, available at http://www.washingtontechnology.com/
print/19_.2/23301-1.html (quoting a policy associate at the National Conference of State
Legislators who suggests that states employ offshore contracting restrictions to combat
growing local economic problems).
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Foreign Commerce Clause. 190 Applying heightened scrutiny, a court
is likely to find that the restrictions amount to "simple economic pro-
tectionism" and thus are per se invalid.191 Individual states are at-
tempting to block the flow of international commerce at the nation's
borders and limit foreign access to state markets by requiring "busi-
ness operations to be performed in the home State that could more
efficiently be performed elsewhere." 192 This is plainly impermissible
because states may not discriminate against foreign commerce based
on the location of the business operations if the discrimination is un-
related to differences in the business operations. 193 Furthermore,
state offshore contracting restrictions do not fit into the Maine v. Tay-
lor exception because shielding in-state industries from out-of-state
competition is not a legitimate local purpose, especially because less
discriminatory means exist to stimulate the local economy.194
Even if state offshore contracting restrictions are not facially dis-
criminatory or they otherwise escape the per se rule of invalidity, they
fail because the states could employ less burdensome alternatives to
further their interest in local economic growth and employment.
States could use taxes, subsidies, and social services as tools to attract
investment and promote employment. 195 Additionally, states could
increase spending in non-offshorable areas of procurement-like
public works projects-to drive the economy.1 96 Another option
would be for states to invest in human capital through education and
training to ensure a capable, attractive local workforce. 197 Indeed, the
U.S. Department of Commerce notes that one of the best remedies
for offshore job loss is economic growth to create newjobs. 198 Moreo-
ver, the Constitution does not force states to privatize;1 99 states could
simply avoid offshore contracting by performing services in-house, a
strategy used by the State of Michigan. 200 In fact, many governments
have recently reclaimed public functions from private contractors
190 See Kraft Gen. Foods, 505 U.S. at 81.
191 See Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978).
192 Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 145 (1970).
193 Amerada Hess Corp. v. N.J. Taxation Div., 490 U.S. 66, 78 (1989).
194 See infra notes 195-02 and accompanying text.
195 See Andy Opsahl, The Line Government Won't Cross, GOVT TECH, Oct. 2, 2006, http://
www.govtech.com/gt/101350.
196 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 55, at 207 (arguing that the offshoring deal "would save
Indiana state residents precious tax dollars that could be deployed to hire more state work-
ers somewhere else, or build new schools that would permanently shrink its roles of
unemployed").
197 See SUSAN B. HANSEN, GLOBALIZATION AND THE POLITICS OF PAY: POLICY CHOICES IN
THE AMERICAN STATES 137-43 (2006).
198 GAO TRADE REPORT, supra note 29, at 71.
199 See Hutchens, supra note 171, at 463 ("The states certainly have the option of not
spending the money ....").
200 See Opsahl, supra note 195.
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through "reverse privatization." 20 If a state elects to use the open
market, however, it may not employ discriminatory means to give con-
tractors engaged in domestic commerce an advantage over those en-
gaged in foreign commerce. 20 2
b. Prevents Nation from Speaking with "One Voice" in
International Trade
Assuming that state offshoring restrictions pass muster under the
traditional Commerce Clause scrutiny, the measures nonetheless fail
because they prevent the nation from speaking with "one voice" in
international trade relations.203 In effect, the regulations are attempts
by states to mold national trade policy to fit the states' local policy
objections. 20 4 Because regulation of international trade implicates
sensitive matters of foreign affairs, independent state regulation can
only impede and complicate foreign relations. 20 5 Indeed, one of the
bases of this nation's foreign relations is international trade. The
United States is a party to scores of international trade treaties, 206 and
it would be "utterly inconsistent" if states could frustrate the spirit of
those agreements with conflicting sub-national policies.20 7
i. Undermines National Trade Policy
State offshore contracting restrictions undermine national trade
policy, which aggressively supports open-market and free-trade princi-
ples.20 8 By championing free trade, the United States seeks to
"remov[e] perceived barriers to the flow of money, services, and
goods."20 9 As the President's 2007 Trade Policy Agenda reports:
201 See Amir Hefetz & Mildred Warner, Beyond the Market Versus Planning Dichotomy: Un-
derstanding Privatisation and its Reverse in U.S. Cities, 33 LOCAL GOV'T STUD. 555, 556 (2007).
202 Cf C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 394 (1994)
("[H]aving elected to use the open market to earn revenues .... the town may not employ
discriminatory regulation to give that project an advantage over rival businesses from out
of State.").
203 SeeJapan Line, Ltd. v. County of L.A., 441 U.S. 434, 450 (1979).
204 Cf Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Bd. of Comm'rs of the Dep't of Water & Power, 80
Cal. Rptr. 800, 805-06 (1969) (holding that the California Buy American Act undermines
the federal government's power to conduct foreign relations).
205 See id. at 803.
206 See generally Trade Compliance Center: Making America's Trade Agreements Work
for You!, http://tcc.export.gov/TradeAgreements (last visited Oct. 2, 2008).
207 Cf Bethlehem Steel Corp., 80 Cal. Rptr. at 803 n.6 (citation omitted).
208 See OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE PRESI-
DENT'S TRADE POLICY AGENDA 14 (2007) [hereinafter PRESIDENT's TRADE POLICY AGENDA];
Jean Heilman Crier, Recent Developments in International Trade Agreements Covering Government
Procurement, 35 PUB. CoT. L.J. 385, 386 (2006).
209 Mildred Warner & Jennifer Gerbasi, Is There a Democratic Deficit in the Free Trade
Agreements? What Local Governments Should Know, PUB. MGMT., Mar. 2004, at 16, 17.
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The necessity of opening the world to free and fair trade is impera-
ive .... For generations, America has opened its markets and in-
creased its exports of goods and services to the world. America's
embrace of competition, the rule of law, and innovation have
spurred its tremendous economic growth and prosperity. In the
face of growing competition and increased globalization, the
United States must embrace and advance the free and fair trade
princip[le]s that have led to so much economic success. This re-
mains a guiding imperative in U.S. trade policy as we pursue an
exciting agenda for 2007 and beyond. 2 10
Within this free-trade framework, national trade policy strongly
advocates liberalized government procurement.2 1 1 The United States
has, through its international agreements, successfully pried open for-
eign-government markets to U.S. suppliers and opened domestic-gov-
ernment markets to foreign bidding.212 And the federal government
has encouraged the states to do the same.213 Although Congress took
limited action to restrict offshore performance of federal contracts in
2004,214 this is best viewed as an aberration to the otherwise strong
and consistent national free-trade agenda. Even a recent bipartisan
trade agreement does not permit states to restrict offshore perform-
ance of contracts.2 1 5
Today, the United States uses two primary vehicles to pursue lib-
eralization of government procurement markets: the Agreement on
Government Procurement (GPA) and the so-called Free Trade Agree-
ments (FTAs). The GPA-dubbed the "first major breakthrough" in
liberalized government procurement 2 16-is a multilateral treaty that
binds only those nations that have specifically signed on to it.2 17
210 PRESIDENT's TRADE POLICY AGENDA, supra note 208, at 14.
211 See generally Grier, supra note 208; Office of the U.S. Trade Rep., USTR Focus on
Government Procurement, http://www.ustr.gov/Trade-Sectors/GovernmentProcure-
ment/SectionIndex.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2008) ("A longstanding objective of U.S.
trade policy has been to open opportunities for U.S. suppliers to compete on a level play-
ing field for foreign government contracts.").
212 See OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, TRADE
FACTS: STATE GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT AND TRADE AGREEMENTS: SENDING A POSITIVE SIG-
NAL ABOUT WELCOMING INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS AND INVESTMENT (2006), http://
www.ustr.gov/assets/Document_- Library/FactSheets/2006/assetuploadfile344_9260.
pdf (hereinafter USTR, SENDING POSITIVE SIGNAL].
213 See id.
214 See, e.g., Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-199, § 647, 118
Stat. 3, 361-62 (2004) (requiring a one-year, limited ban on offshoring certain federal
agency contacts in 2004).
215 See OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, TRADE
FACTS: BIPARTISAN TRADE DEAL (2007), http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document_- Library/
FactSheets/2007/assetupload filel27_11319.pdf [hereinafter USTR, BIPARTISAN TRADE
DEAL].
216 OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ANNUAL RE-
PORT ON DISCRIMINATION IN FOREIGN GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT 1 (2001).
217 See Grier, supra note 208, at 387.
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Under its terms, parties are generally required to accord "no less fa-
vourable" treatment to products, services, and suppliers of any other
party to the Agreement than they give to their own domestic products,
services, and suppliers.2 1 8 In the United States, the GPA only binds
federal entities, but the federal government has persuaded many
states to join voluntarily.2 19 In recent years, the United States has used
the GPA as a model for procurement provisions in FTAs, which are
regional or bilateral free-trade agreements. 220 Because "[m] ost of the
Parties to FTAs are not Parties to the GPA,"221 the FTAs are an impor-
tant means for the United States to gain access to new government-
purchasing markets.
Against this strong national policy of free trade and liberalized
government procurement, one can observe that state offshore con-
tracting restrictions run contrary to national trade policy.222 States
are subverting the nation's liberal procurement agenda by advancing
protectionist offshore contracting policies that attempt to regulate
conduct beyond the nation's borders. The nation cannot speak with
"one voice" in its trade relations if the nation has fifty-one State De-
partments, some of which promote or implement protectionist poli-
cies. 223 Although a lack of data makes the effect of these restrictions
on the nation's "one voice" less than transparent, these restrictions
clearly burden a significant amount of international trade in ser-
vices, 224 one of the fastest growing areas of trade.225 The threat to
national uniformity is magnified if these individual state restrictions
are viewed in the aggregate.2 26
218 Agreement on Government Procurement art. III, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agree-
ment Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 4B, 1915 U.N.T.S. 103; cf Gen-
eral Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing
the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, 1915 U.N.T.S. 103 (dealing with the private
sector).
219 See Grier, supra note 208, at 390 (noting that the United States applies a $526,000
threshold for member states to be subject to GPA provisions); James E. Meadows, Dealing
with the Offshore Outsourcing Controversy, 807 PLI/PAT 413, 434-35 (2004).
220 See Grier, supra note 208, at 388.
221 See id. at 395.
222 See Warner & Gerbasi, supra note 209, at 17 ("Clearly, protectionist legislation
would be contrary to the spirit of the trade agreements . . ").
223 See Brannon P. Denning &Jack H. McCall,Jr., The Constitutionality of State and Local
"Sanctions"Against Foreign Countries: Affairs of State, States'Affairs, or a Sony State of Affairs ?, 26
HAsrINGS CoNST. L.Q. 307, 331-34 (1999).
224 See supra Part I.B.
225 See Aaditya Mattoo & Sacha Wunsch-Vincent, Pre-empting Protectionism in Services: The
GATS and Outsourcing, 7J. INr'L EcoN. L. 765, 765 (2004).
226 See Nat'l Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 53 (1st Cir. 1999), affd in
result sub nom. Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000); cf. Japan Line,
Ltd. v. County of L.A., 441 U.S. 434, 453 (1979).
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ii. Frustrates International Trade Relations
States' attempts to restrict offshore contracting frustrate interna-
tional trade relations and have caused a rift between the United States
and India. On March 4, 2004, the Indian mission to Geneva, Switzer-
land organized a meeting to discuss the rise of state offshoring legisla-
tion. 22 7 Then, on March 9, 2004, India voiced its concerns to the
World Trade Organization (WTO) about state-government anti-off-
shoring measures. 228 India's Ambassador to the WTO K.M. Chan-
drasekhar, referring to a state offshoring bill, stated that " [c] learly we
are concerned about what is happening in the United States." 229
Situations like this may also impair future trade negotiations be-
tween the United States and India. Indeed, state offshore contracting
restrictions risk undermining the spirit of future U.S.-India trade rela-
tions by discouraging the free flow of U.S. state contract funds into
India.230
Accordingly, Ambassador Chandrasekhar hinted that U.S. off-
shoring restrictions might have "negative consequences" for the Doha
Round of trade negotiations.2 31 The Indian Department of Com-
merce similarly announced that anti-offshoring measures send the
wrong signal in the context of trade negotiations, which are aimed at
improving market access.232 India's Commerce Minister also told U.S.
officials that offshoring restrictions are "unacceptable for India."23 3
The situation is reminiscent of the 1960s, when the Kennedy adminis-
tration feared that it could not secure tariff concessions from foreign
nations in the face of state Buy American laws. 234 Likewise today,
given the rapid growth of U.S.-India bilateral trade and India's possi-
ble accession to the GPA, one must view sub-national interference
with U.S.-Indian trade relations with increased skepticism because of
the sensitive and ongoing nature of the negotiations. 235
227 Daniel Pruzin, Outsourcing: At WTO Meeting, India Signals Concern About U.S. Moves to
Counter Outsourcing, WTO Rep. (BNA) ISSN 1529-4153 (Mar. 9, 2004).
228 Id.
229 Id.
230 Id.
231 Id.
232 See Press Release, Dep't of Commerce of India, Market Denial, Not Market Access,
Says Jaitley Reacting to Reported US Move to Ban Outsourcing (May 26, 2003), available at
http://commerce.nic.in/PressRelease/pressrelease-detail.asp?id=363 (last visited Oct. 2,
2008).
233 Pruzin, supra note 227.
234 See Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Bd. of Comm'rs of the Dep't of Water & Power, 80
Cal. Rptr. 800, 805 n.11 (1969).
235 See Press Release, U.S. Mission to the United Nations in Geneva, Trade Policy Re-
view of India: Statement by Ambassador Peter F. Allgeier, U.S. Permanent Representative
to the WTO (May 24, 2007), available at http://geneva.usmission.gov/Press2007/
0524TPRIndia.html ("We understand that India is considering the possibility ofjoining the
WrO Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA), and we strongly encourage its ac-
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State offshore contracting restrictions may also frustrate bilateral
trade relations between the United States and Canada. 236 Given the
large value of cross-border trade between the two nations-an esti-
mated $580 billion in 2005-state regulations that burden this trade
are of particular concern to the Canadian government.237 In 2004,
Canadian provinces were worried that proposed state anti-offshoring
legislation would result in loss of call-center jobs in Canada, 238 poten-
tially placing 200,000 Canadian jobs at risk.239 In an effort to mitigate
the potential damage to its economy from the measures, the Canadian
government went on the offensive in 2004 and lobbied U.S. federal
officials, businesses, and the public.2 40 To that end, Canada has sent
letters to officials in Washington outlining the negative economic con-
sequences of U.S. state anti-offshoring policies and suggesting that the
policies might violate U.S. treaty obligations.24t Overall, Canada has
put its faith in the U.S. federal government to "step in to prevent [the
proposed bills] from affecting Canada's economy."242
iii. Invites Retaliation
State offshoring restrictions also invite foreign retaliation that in-
dividual states are ill-equipped to handle. As the U.S. Trade Repre-
sentative warns, a state's non-commitment to "transparent and
competitive purchasing" may cause foreign nations to discriminate
against goods and services from that state,243 and foreign companies
might hesitate to conduct business with private firms in that state. 244
Some retaliation might even be automatic. 245 Not only are individual
cession to the agreement."); OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT, TRADE FACTS: U.S.-INDIA TRADE POLICY FORUM (2006), http://www.ustr.gov/as-
sets/Document_Library/Fact Sheets/2006/asset_uploadjfile32 9583.pdf (describing
the ongoing nature of U.S.-India bilateral negotiations).
236 See Steven Chase, U.S. Bills Threaten Canada's Call Centres: American Contracts Could Be
Affected, THE GLOBE & MAIL (Canada), Feb. 19, 2004, at BI, LexisNexis Academic (quoting
a letter from the Canadian Ambassador to United States sent to U.S. Trade Representative:
"NewJersey's proposed [offshoring] legislation would unduly and unjustifiably affect cross-
border trade in a number of key service sectors including business services, distribution
services, financial services and tourism and travel-related services.").
237 See E-mail from Matthew Shannon, Foreign Affairs Canada and Int'l Trade, Gov't of
Can., to author (Oct. 17, 2007, 12:02:00 EDT) (on file with author); Chase, supra note 236.
238 See Chase, supra note 236.
239 Stephen Handelman, Getting Hung Up on Call Centers: Why an Anti-Outsourcing Bill in
New Jersey Could Wreak Havoc in Canada, TIME INT'L, Apr. 18, 2004, at 30, LexisNexis
Academic.
240 See E-mail from Matthew Shannon, supra note 237; Letter from Robert Zoellick,
U.S. Trade Rep., to Michael Kergin, Ambassador of Can. to the U.S. (Aug. 11, 2003) (on
file with author).
241 See Letter from Robert B. Zoellick, supra note 240.
242 See Chase, supra note 236.
243 USTR, SENDING POSITIVE SIGNAL, supra note 212.
244 Id.
245 SeeJapan Line, Ltd. v. County of L.A., 441 U.S. 434, 453 n.18 (1979).
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states not competent to deal with foreign retaliation, 246 but also the
actions of one state can trigger retaliation against the entire nation.2 47
The citizens of one state should not have to rely on the legislature of
another state to minimize foreign retaliation against the entire nation
and not jeopardize national trade policy. 248 Additionally, foreign re-
taliation could undermine the local economic policies that the states
are seeking to effectuate through offshore contracting restrictions. 249
In the end, only the federal government can minimize the risk of re-
taliation by ensuring that all appropriate foreign interests are repre-
sented in policy decisions that affect foreign commerce. 250
iv. Embarrasses the Nation
Finally, state offshore contracting restrictions embarrass the na-
tion in the international arena by undermining the appearance of na-
tional unity. The world could view the federal government as unable
to control its sub-national units if states choose the protectionist road
while the national government continues down the road of trade lib-
eralization. 25' This lack of perceived unity might impair the federal
government's ability to negotiate favorable trade agreements. 252 A
lack of unity might also deter private foreign investment into the
country because of conflicting and uncertain foreign commercial reg-
ulatory schemes in the states.2 53
c. Market Participant Exception Does Not (or Should Not) Apply
State offshore contracting restrictions cannot escape scrutiny
under the market participant exception to the Interstate Commerce
Clause because that exception does not (or should not) apply to the
246 See Denning & McCall, supra note 223, at 350.
247 See Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 450.
248 See Alisa B. Klein & Mark B. Stern, Back to First Principles: The Constitutional Rationale
for Invalidating Local Sanctions Against Foreign Trade, 33 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 77, 93
(2001).
249 See Adam Mordecai, Note, Anti-Offshoring Legislation: The New Wave of Protectionism, 5
RiCH. J. GLOBAL L. & Bus. 85, 102 (2005) ("Any successful protectionist measures will do
little to create jobs and will only serve to encourage foreign retaliation, thus resulting in
more jobs lost than saved.") (citation omitted); O'Neil, supra note 113, at 542 ("Retaliation
causes increased trade barriers, which in turn result in the loss of gains from trade and
deterioration in the economic welfare of the nation.") (citation omitted).
250 See S.-Cent. Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 92 (1984); Klein & Stern,
supra note 248, at 91 ("And it is axiomatic that when the interests of all of the nation's
citizens are concerned, the power to act lies exclusively with the federal government.").
251 See Nat'l Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 53 (1st Cir. 1999) ("Massa-
chusetts has chosen a course divergent.., from the federal law, thus raising the prospect
of embarrassment for the country."), afj'd in result sub nom. Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade
Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000).
252 See Anderson L. Cao, Comment, Limiting States' Roles in Foreign Commerce: Teaching
Old-World Dogs New-World Tricks, 23 Hous. J. Ir'L L. 349, 373-74 (2001).
253 See id. at 374.
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Foreign Commerce Clause. 254 Although the exception may allow
states to get past traditional Commerce Clause scrutiny,255 it cannot
shelter state activity under Japan Line's heightened scrutiny of state
regulation of foreign commerce.2 5 6 The Supreme Court has implied
as much. 257 Superimposing the exception onto the "one voice" test of
Japan Line would ignore the sensitive foreign affairs concerns that
arise in the foreign commerce context.2 5s It would also condone state
entry into the forbidden field of foreign relations that the Constitu-
tion reserves exclusively to the federal government.259 Allowing state
regulation of offshore contracting would create "a dangerous prece-
dent" for state involvement in foreign affairs. 260
Although state spending is a traditional area of state compe-
tence, 261 the state spending power is not without its limits, 262 and a
state may not use its spending power to obstruct national foreign
trade policy.263 The Constitution cannot allow a state to affect inter-
national trade relations by banning offshore contracting merely be-
cause it is acting as a purchaser of goods or services in the market. It
is unreasonable to assume that a foreign government could under-
stand the constitutional distinction between a "market participant"
and a "market regulator."264 Thus, even one state's discrimination
against foreign commerce incident to its role as a participant in the
market risks retaliation against the entire nation.2 65
Even if the market participant exception did apply to the Foreign
Commerce Clause, certain forms of offshore state contracting restric-
tions would not be covered by the exception because they cross the
line from market participation to market regulation. Some states, for
254 See, e.g., Natsios, 181 F.3d at 65-66.
255 But this too is questionable. See infra notes 266-71 and accompanying text.
256 See Wardair Can., Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Revenue, 477 U.S. 1, 8 (1986); S.-Cent. Tim-
ber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 100 (1984);Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of L.A., 441
U.S. 434, 446 (1979).
257 See Reeves v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 437-38 n. 9 (1980); supra Part II.A.2.c.
258 See supra Part II.A.3.
259 See United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 233 (1942) ("Power over external affairs is
not shared by the States; it is vested in the national government exclusively."); Hutchens,
supra note 171, at 476 (arguing that applying the market-participant exception to dormant
Foreign Commerce Clause "would do violence to the foreign affairs powers that the Consti-
tution vests solely in the federal government").
260 See Mattoo & Wunsch-Vincent, supra note 225, at 773.
261 See Reeves, 447 U.S. at 436-41.
262 See, e.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (holding
that state and local governments must pay the federal minimum wage).
263 See, e.g., U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 841 (1995) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) ("The States have no power, reserved or otherwise, over the exercise of fed-
eral authority within its proper sphere.") (citation omitted).
264 See Kevin P. Lewis, Dealing with South Africa: The Constitutionality of State and Local
Divestment Legislation, 61 TUL. L. REv. 469, 484-85 (1987).
265 Hutchens, supra note 171, at 462; Lewis, supra note 264, at 485.
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instance, seek to disqualify companies that have offshored American
jobs from receiving state procurement contracts, even if the offshor-
ing is unrelated to the state contract.2 6 6 These attempts amount to
market regulation because the states are participating in the public
procurement market yet regulating the unrelated private operations
of its vendors. 267 Additionally, state offshore contract bans like New
Jersey's 268 may amount to market regulation because they burden not
only the initial contractor, but also downstream subcontractors and
suppliers. 269 Furthermore, state offshore contracting restrictions have
substantial regulatory effect outside of the procurement market be-
cause they burden foreign commerce and interfere with national
trade policy and international trade relations.2 70 Nonetheless, even if
the market participant exception did apply, and the state was acting as
a market participant, the restrictions fail because they unduly inter-
fere with the federal government's ability to conduct foreign affairs.2 71
B. Foreign Affairs Power
1. Overview of Foreign Affairs Power
Many provisions of the Constitution taken together stand for the
principle that the federal government has the exclusive power to con-
duct foreign affairs.2 72 The Supreme Court has long held that federal
power over foreign affairs is "not shared by the States." 273 Similar to
the dormant foreign commerce power, the dormant foreign affairs
power can preempt state law in the absence of any federal action to
the contrary. 274 The leading case in this area is Zschernig v. Miller, in
which the Court invalidated an Oregon statute that effectively pre-
vented inheritance by citizens of communist nations. 27 5 The Court
held that the dormant foreign affairs power preempted the Oregon
statute because it interfered with the federal government's ability to
conduct international relations by casting judgment on foreign na-
266 See, e.g., S.B. 1249, 48th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2008); Job Preservation Act of
2007, S.B. 1255, 95th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (111. 2007); supra note 76.
267 See, e.g., H.B. 389, 2007 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Pa.) (disqualifying those contractors who
have offshoredjobs within the past three years from bidding on state contracts); H.B. 568,
95th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (I1. 2007) (disqualifying an entity from state contract
awards if it "has or uses a foreign call service center").
268 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:34-13.2 (West 2005).
269 See O'Neil, supra note 113, at 538-39.
270 See S.-Cent. Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 100 (1984); supra Part
II.A.3.
271 See infra Part II.B.
272 See Nat'l Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 1999), affd in result
sub nom. Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000).
273 See United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 233 (1942).
274 See Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 441 (1968) (Stewart, J., concurring) ("[E]ven
in absence of a treaty, a State's policy may disturb foreign relations.").
275 Id. at 429.
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tions.276 Although the "precise boundaries" of Zschernig are un-
clear,27 7 notwithstanding state interests, 2 78 states may not exceed a
threshold level of involvement in foreign affairs. 279 In one case, a Cal-
ifornia court invalidated California's Buy American Act because it
amounted to a "usurpation" by California of the federal power to con-
duct international trade policy by placing a de-facto embargo on for-
eign products. 28 0 In another case, the Third Circuit rejected a
dormant foreign affairs challenge to Pennsylvania's Buy American Act
because the Act did not involve scrutiny of foreign governments, any
interference with national trade policy was speculative, and Congress
had not taken any action to preempt the Act.2 8'
2. Application of Foreign Affairs Power to State Offshore Contracting
Restrictions
The same analysis that would render state offshoring restrictions
unconstitutional under Japan Line would do the same under the doc-
trine of dormant foreign affairs preemption. The "'one-voice' test [of
Japan Line] is functionally similar to dormant foreign affairs preemp-
tion" because it focuses primarily on the risk of a state action offend-
ing foreign nations and provoking retaliation. 28 2 Except, here, no
market-participant exception exists28 3 and state interests are irrele-
vant.284 Although some argue that the Supreme Court prefers dor-
mant foreign affairs preemption to dormant foreign commerce
preemption, the better view is to treat both doctrines as distinct and
equally valid in the absence of explicit Supreme Court guidance to the
contrary.28 5
276 Id. at 440-42.
277 Natsios, 181 F.3d at 51-52.
278 Id. at 52 ("We do not read Zschernig as instructing courts to balance the nation's
interests in a unified foreign policy against the particular interests of an individual state.").
279 Compare Trojan Techs., Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 916 F.2d 903, 909 (3d Cir. 1990), with
Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Bd. of Comm'rs of the Dep't of Water & Power, 80 Cal. Rptr. 800
(1969).
280 See Bethlehem Stee4 800 Cal. Rptr. at 803.
281 See Trojan Techs., 916 F.2d at 909.
282 Jack Goldsmith, Statutory Foreign Affairs Preemption 22 (John M. Olin Law & Econ.
Working Paper No. 116, 2007).
283 See Natsios, 181 F.3d at 59 (rejecting, as novel and unsupported, the argument that
the market participant exception exists as to the foreign affairs power).
284 See id. at 52.
285 Those who argue that recent Supreme Court decisions evince the Court's prefer-
ence to decide cases on preemption grounds instead of dormant commerce grounds con-
tend that the Court should avoid needless constitutional confrontation. See, e.g., Leanne
M. Wilson, Note, The Fate of the Dormant Foreign Commerce Clause After Garamendi and
Crosby, 107 COLUM. L. REv. 746, 784-85 (2007) (suggesting the elimination of dormant
foreign commerce in favor of foreign affairs preemption). But the Court has never indi-
cated that dormant foreign commerce challenges are disfavored, and dormant foreign af-
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State offshore contracting restrictions amount to an embargo on
foreign service providers and unduly interfere with the federal govern-
ment's ability to conduct international relations. 286 As discussed ear-
lier, the restrictions frustrate national uniformity because they
undermine the spirit of the nation's liberalized trade agenda, which is
a major tenant of the nation's foreign policy.28 7 The restrictions also
risk offending foreign nations and have in fact provoked strong re-
bukes from India and Canada. 288 These sub-national restrictions en-
tail a serious risk of retaliation, especially because foreign nations may
view them as "selfish provincialism" instead of an expression of impor-
tant local policy.28 9 Even though state offshore contracting restric-
tions do not target a particular nation,290 they nonetheless undermine
and frustrate the nation's foreign policy agenda and embarrass the
nation in its international dealings.
III
GOVERNMENT BY THE PEOPLE? POLICY CHOICES FOR
THE NATION
Application of these constitutional principles to state offshore
contracting restrictions leads to a curious outcome. If a state places a
contract into the stream of commerce, the Constitution renders the
state virtually powerless to prevent its contractors from using offshore
labor. But this legal conclusion begs the question: does this result
make for good public policy?
Proponents of offshore contracting argue that offshoring is too
advantageous for state governments to pass up because it has the po-
tential to save them a significant amount of money.29 1 South Caro-
lina, for instance, realized savings of nearly $10 million in 2004 by
hiring an IT contractor that used offshore labor.292 Indiana similarly
would have saved almost $8 million by using Indian workers to build a
state computer had the Governor not canceled the contract once its
fairs preemption does in fact implicate the Constitution vis-A-vis the Supremacy Clause. See
BrrrKER, supra note 110, §5.06[F].
286 See Bethlehem Steel Corp., 80 Cal. Rptr. at 803 ("Only the federal government can fix
the rules of fair competition when such competition is on an international basis .... State
regulation can only impede, not foster, national trade policies.").
287 See supra Part II.A.3.
288 See supra Part II.A.3.b.2. Cf Trojan Techs., Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 916 F.2d 903, 909
(3d Cir. 1990) (opining that any interference with foreign relations is merely speculative).
289 Cf Bethlehem Steel Corp., 80 Cal. Rptr. at 805.
290 Cf Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000) (invalidating Massa-
chusetts Burma law on statutory preemption grounds).
291 See Opsahl, supra note 195; Salzer, supra note 49; Alison Lake, Why Not Mumbai?,
GovTECH, Dec. 19, 2006, http://www.govtech.com/pcio/102966 ("The public sector's
skepticism, even hostility, toward offshore outsourcing seems off-base, given its apparent
success in the private sector.").
292 See Hopkins, supra note 3, at 1A.
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details became public.293 Indeed, the costs of requiring domestic per-
formance, instead of offshore performance, can be staggering: New
Jersey spends an additional 37 cents per call-or $73,800 per
month-to maintain a call center in the United States rather than in
India.294 Using the savings that they might realize through offshore
contracting, states can lower taxes or redeploy the savings to hire
American workers in other areas, like public works.295 Additionally,
offshoring may afford state personnel managers greater flexibility by
increasing opportunities to employ part-time and overnight
workers. 296
Opponents of offshore state contracting argue that it threatens
the very nature of state government. At a time when states are seeking
to stimulate the local economy, many believe that performing state
services abroad exacerbates unemployment by depriving Americans of
government jobs.2 9 7 As New Jersey lawmaker Shirley Turner re-
marked, "It is poor public policy to use taxpayer money to create jobs
outside of the country when we have people here who are unem-
ployed."298 Turner believes that sending state jobs overseas when state
residents are unemployed is akin to "'shooting yourself in the
foot."' 29 9 Moreover, offshoring may erode the state tax base, as off-
shore workers do not pay state taxes. 300 It may also deprive states of
the economic benefits that the jobs bring.30 1 Consistent with these
concerns, states like New Jersey have cast aside strict adherence to the
free-market principles advocated on the national level and have
adopted more pragmatic approaches to procurement by restricting
293 See Labor Agency Taps India Firm for State Project, supra note 53, at 9.
294 Fernandez & Von Bergen, supra note 21.
295 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 55, at 207.
296 Mark B. Baker, "The Technology Dog Ate My Job": The Dog-Eat-Dog World of Offshore
Labor Outsourcing, 16 FLA. J. INT'L L. 807, 814 (2004).
297 See Small, supra note 97.
298 Fernandez & Von Bergen, supra note 21; see also Press Release, Office of Governor
of N.J., supra note 187 ("'It is foolish for the state to send taxpayer dollars abroad to hire
workers in India, China or Indonesia when these same jobs can be performed by the unem-
ployed here in the United States.'" (quoting N.J. State Senator Shirley K. Turner)).
299 Ed Parry, "Not in My Backyard "-State Lawmakers Fight Offshoring, SARCHCIO.coM,
Mar. 15, 2004 (quoting N.J. State Senator Shirley K. Turner) (on file with the author).
300 See Karen MacPherson, States Sending Jobs Overseas: Legislatures Consider Ban on "Out-
sourcing" Government Business, PITTSBURGH POsT-GAzETrE, Apr. 4, 2004, at A8, LexisNexis
Academic ("'By hiring Americans, you create taxpayers. You pump money into your local
economy.") (quoting Ohio State Rep. Marcy Kaptur). Similarly, as one public-employee
union official declared, "'It's outrageous to use taxpayer dollars to erode your tax base.'"
Hopkins, supra note 3, at IA.
301 See Press Release, Office of Governor of N.J., supra note 187 ("'Not only are we
losing the benefits those jobs bring to the individual, but we also lose the tax and economic
growth benefits those jobs bring to the state.'" (quoting N.J. State Senator Shirley K.
Turner)).
198 [Vol. 94:165
2008] THE OFFSHORING OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 199
contractors from performing contacts overseas.3 0 2 These approaches
consider the special duty of the state to promote democracy and to
ensure the general welfare of its residents, 30 3 in addition to the poten-
tial for offshore contracting to increase costs to the state.3 0 4
Two solutions exist for the state seeking to curtail the offshore
performance of state service contracts within the bounds of the Con-
stitution. First, the state can withdraw offshoreable state service con-
tracts from the stream of commerce and handle such services in-
house.3 0 5 Second, Congress can sanction state regulation of offshore
state contracting.30 6 So, if a state seeks to take advantage of privatiza-
tion, while keeping jobs in the United States, the question comes
down to whether Congress should, as a policy matter, permit states to
do so. 3 0 7
Given the challenges that offshore state contracting may pose for
state governments, the nation should engage in a serious debate
about whether Congress should permit states to restrict offshore con-
tracting. Until now, this debate has been lacking. Many previous fed-
eral requests for state input into national trade policy have been "one-
sided" and directed at the executive rather than the legislature. -0 8 Al-
though the federal government has recently shown some willingness
to recognize local policies in international trade agreements, such as
minimum wage and environmental policies, these discussions have
not considered offshore state contracting. 309
The federal government must recognize the states' traditional
role as guardian of their citizens and promoter of their general wel-
fare, while balancing the national interest in uniform trade regulation
302 See Opsahl, supra note 195. Interestingly, Texas has engaged in "bestshoring,"
which requires the work to be performed in, of course, Texas. Id.
303 See generallyJennifer Gerbasi & Mildred E. Warner, Privatization, Public Goods and the
Ironic Challenge of Free Trade Agreements, 39 ADMIN. & SOC. 127 (2007) (arguing that sub-
national governments are fundamentally concerned with democracy, voice, and choice);
Warner & Gerbasi, supra note 209, at 18 (remarking that the primary role of state govern-
ment is to guard and serve residents). As one lawmaker says, state government "should not
be in the business of putting our own citizens out of work." Press Release, Office of Gover-
nor of N.J., supra note 187.
304 See Lindquist, supra note 1, at Al (noting that the cost to run a Florida state call-
center increased after the state contractor moved offshore). See generally DELOITTE CON-
SULTING, CALLING A CHANGE IN THE OUTSOURCING MARKET: THE REALITIES FOR THE WORLD'S
LARGEST ORGANIZATIONS 2-3 (2005) (discussing the hidden costs of offshoring).
305 See supra notes 199-200 and accompanying text.
306 It is a well-established principle that, "whether a case is decided on preemption or
dormant Commerce Clause grounds, the judicial verdict cpn be reversed by Congress."
BIrrKER, supra note 110, § 5.06[F].
307 Cf Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of L.A., 441 U.S. 434, 457 (1979) ("The problems to
which appellees refer are problems that admit only of a federal remedy. They do not
admit of a unilateral solution by a State.").
308 See Gerbasi & Warner supra note 303, at 143.
309 See USTR, BIPARTISAN TRADE DEAL, supra note 215.
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and liberalized procurement. Notwithstanding the benefits of free
trade, the current national trade agenda undercuts the authority of
states to regulate contractors that are active within their borders.3 1 0
By interpreting offshore contracting restrictions as barriers to
trade, 31' national trade policy substitutes international trade norms
for the sound judgment of state lawmakers attempting to protect the
public welfare.31 2 This "singular focus on reducing trade barriers"
might frustrate the states' ability to act as the invisible hand in their
own markets such that they may achieve optimal social welfare. 313 In
the end, states are concerned about more than efficiency; states must
also consider public accountability, democratic choice, and quality of
life. 314 States' lack of constitutional power to manage offshore con-
tracting may hinder their ability to act as guardian of the general
welfare.
Before this debate can occur, however, federal and state govern-
ments must commit to comprehensively study the issue of offshore
contracting because solutions, if any, depend on the availability of
data. 31 5 At present the nation knows too little about the conse-
quences of offshoring.31 6 Most states do not track the location of con-
tract performance and state proposals to restrict offshore contracting
are often accompanied by more political rhetoric than economic anal-
ysis. 317 As one article warns, "[b]ecause no clear consensus or study
citing the actual impact [of offshoring] on U.S. domestic labor cur-
rently exists, new offshore outsourcing regulation faces the risk of be-
ing based on false data. ' 318 Accordingly, Congress should require
states proposing offshore contracting restrictions to study its inci-
310 See Gerbasi & Warner, supra note 303, at 142 ("New agreements target government
regulation of areas traditionally reserved to states including the protection of health,
morals, and economic development within state borders. Lack of involvement of states in
the negotiation of these rules can undermine their traditional areas of authority.").
311 See id.
312 Warner & Gerbasi, supra note 209, at 18.
313 Gerbasi & Warner, supra note 303, at 144; see also Hefetz & Warner, supra note 201,
at 558.
314 See Mildred E. Warner & Amir Hafetz, Managing Markets for Public Service: The Role of
Mixed Public-Private Delivery of City Services, 68 PuB. ADMIN. REv. 155, 163 (2008).
315 See GAO TRADE REPORT, supra note 29, at 4; Justin Kent Holcombe, Solutions for
Regulating Offshore Outsourcing in the Service Sector: Using the Law, Market, International Mecha-
nisms, and Collective Organization as Building Blocks, 7 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 539, 549
(2005).
316 See supra Part I.B.
317 See, e.g., MacPherson, supra note 300 ("'No one has yet done a comparison of the
costs to the state vs. the costs of sending the jobs overseas.'") (citation omitted).
318 Holcombe, supra note 315, at 549. Similarly, a union official recently testified,
"The outsourcing debate is hampered by the lack of objective data to reinforce policy
recommendations to either allow the continued unrestricted use of outsourcing or to re-
strict outsourcing to protect American jobs." Public Hearing Before Assembly Outsourcing and
Off-Shoring Commission, 212th N.J. Leg. 39 (Sept. 14, 2007) (statement of Eric Richard, Leg-
islative Affairs Coordinator, N.J. State AFL-CIO).
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dence and consequences as a prerequisite to federal approval. Armed
with these studies, Congress can narrowly tailor any authorization to
minimize states' intrusion into foreign affairs while specifically ad-
dressing problems that the states identify. By working together, fed-
eral and state officials can apply a global perspective to the challenges
of offshoring, rather than leaving offshore contracting policy in the
hands of state lawmakers with local concerns.319 In the end, the states
might just provide the nation with an "ideal laboratory" to test the
future course of national trade policy.320
CONCLUSION
In a 2006 Foreign Affairs article, Princeton economist Alan Blinder
wrote that almost none of the 22 million government jobs in the
United States "are candidates for offshoring-for obvious political
reasons."32I Although political considerations generally prevent states
from directly offshoring jobs,322 a perfect storm of privatization and
globalization has allowed state contractors to do indirectly what polit-
ics prevent the states from doing directly. Thus, although states do
not generally hire foreign workers directly, many state contractors are
performing state service contracts offshore. Yet politics caught up
with the states as the media began to report on this phenomenon dur-
ing the 2004 election, and a political backlash ensued. Lawmakers in
virtually every state have introduced legislation to restrict offshore
state contracting.
But the Constitution deprives states of the power to restrict off-
shore contracting. The restrictions violate the Foreign Commerce
Clause of the Constitution because they discriminate against foreign
commerce and prevent the federal government from speaking with
"one voice" in foreign affairs. By regulating the international com-
mercial activities of their contractors, states undermine national trade
policy, frustrate international trade relations, invite retaliation, and
embarrass the nation in its foreign dealings. Furthermore, state off-
shore contracting restrictions are not permissible under the "market
participant" exception to the Interstate Commerce Clause because
that exception does not (or should not) apply to the Foreign Com-
merce Clause. Even if it did, state offshore contracting restrictions are
invalid under the doctrine of foreign affairs preemption.
319 See O'Neil, supra note 113, at 544.
320 HANSEN, supra note 197, at 7.
321 Alan Blinder, Offshoring: The Next Industrial Revolution?, 85 FOREIGN AFr. 113, 121
(2006).
322 See, e.g., Labor Agency Taps India Firm for State Project, supra note 53, at 9 (reporting
that Indiana's Governor canceled an offshore contract after public backlash).
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Two solutions exist for states to prevent offshoring of their state
contracts without violating the Constitution. Either the state with-
draws certain contracts from the stream of commerce, or Congress
sanctions state offshore contracting restrictions. Accordingly, a state
that seeks to privatize and ensure that the jobs stay in the United
States must seek authorization from Congress. In this regard, the na-
tion should engage in a serious debate about whether to permit states
to enact these restrictions, given the challenges that offshoring might
pose for state governments. Congress must recognize the states' tradi-
tional role as guardian of their citizens and balance this against the
benefits of uniform trade regulation and liberalized procurement.
Federal and state governments must also make a serious commitment
to study offshore contracting because policy solutions, if any, depend
on the availability of data.
